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Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 Introduction and Research Problem
In January 2008, four Western tourists were kidnapped while on holiday in West
Africa.1 The tourists were seized on their drive to Niger from Mali after attending a
cultural event when shooting started. One vehicle escaped, but the other carrying a
Swiss couple, a German woman, and a British man was disabled by gunfire. Next they
were taken to a nearby country.2 Despite conflicting reports that the tourists were taken
by a rebel group, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) initiated ransom
negotiations.3 AQIM opened negotiations with the British government for Edwin Dyer in
exchange for a high-ranking member of an armed group imprisoned in Britain. After the
British government rejected this offer, AQIM made a second offer for €10 million for
Dyer and one of the Swiss hostages.4 This offer too went unmet, and Mr. Dyer was
executed. However, the Swiss couple and the German woman were freed for a reported
€8 million.
This tragic story is one of many like it that occurs regularly. Suddenly armed
assailants rush unsuspecting aid workers or an improvised check point apprehends a

1. “Organized Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnap for Ransom,” Financial Action Task Force
Report, July 2011, 27.
2

. Ibid, 27.

3

. Ibid, 27.

. Matthew Weaver, “British Hostage Edwin Dyer ‘Killed by al-Qaida’,” The Guardian (London,
UK), June 3, 2009.
4

2
businessperson or journalist unfamiliar with their surroundings. Conditions in captivity
are Spartan, if not harsh, and life as a hostage may last months to years if ransom
negotiations proceed slowly. If a family, government, or other private source will not or
cannot pay a ransom the death of the hostage is almost certain.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation argue terror groups are presented
with different challenges than other illicit groups.5 Asal and Rethemeyer found a strong
terrorist organizational structure correlates positively with that group killing more
people.6 Crenshaw’s work shows a distinction between collective rationality of terrorist
organizations and the rationality of individual terrorists,7 and she argues that these two
interests are not automatically in line with one another in spite of ideology.
Armed groups must adapt to operate in unwelcoming hostile locations. Their
illegal activates require them to operate stealthily to complete their operations without
detection from authorities. However, this normally contradicts with their efforts to
coordinate the tactics that they practice, e.g. bombing public buildings or shooting a
police station, to perpetrate acts of violence. Jacob Shapiro calls the tradeoff between
terrorist operational effectiveness and organizational security as the “terrorist dilemma.”8
The more successful or numerous terror attacks an organization conducts, the more

5

. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
. Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structure and the
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2, (2008): 437.
6

. Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic
Choice,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind, ed. Walter Reich
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 8.
7

. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
8

3
earnestly it must develop increasingly sophisticated standard operating procedures
(SOPs) that are instrumental to masking the identity of an organization, in addition to
other operational aspects. Here, armed groups have an upper hand because
kidnappings are normally conducted in public areas. In fact, kidnappings are vastly
underreported – so reliable statistics are difficult to come by, because many ransoms
are negotiated only between perpetrators and victims’ families.9

1.2 Research Question, Hypothesis, and Essential Definitions
Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of armed
groups? This is the primary question addressed by this thesis. The hypothesis this work
posits is that: Kidnappings enlarges the infrastructure demands required to house
victims, increases financial resources from ransom payments and often succeeds in
wrestling concessions from local governments, particularly where authorities are
ineffectual or anemic. Kidnap for ransom (KfR) is different from other ways terrorist
organizations raise funds, e.g. robbing banks, trafficking narcotics, or legal business
ventures because, unlike kidnapping, these other activities do not have a terror
component. “Kidnapping is the confinement without legal authority of a person by one or
others, against the will of the confined person. In so doing, the perpetrator or
perpetrators often seek some political, financial or other advantage or benefit, such as
the payment of a ransom or the release of imprisoned compatriots.”10 As such,

9
. Everard Philips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom,” in The Faces of Terrorism:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. David Canter (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 191.
10

. See supra note 1, 25.
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kidnapping can be considered a type of hostage taking,11 which the 1979 UN
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages requires signatories to
implement effective measures to prevent, prosecute, and punish as manifestations of
international terrorism.12
Of secondary importance is the broader issue of funding sources, specifically the
narcotics trade. On its face these topics appear tangentially related to KfR. Yet, based
on the research of the case studies the influence of the cocaine trade in Colombia and
the opium trade in Afghanistan is undeniable. KfR is commonly practiced by both armed
groups to varying degrees over the lifespan of each group as a tool to pursue their
political goals as well as to increase revenue. In terms of the wider discussion around
sources of funding for armed groups narco-trafficking is undoubtedly more significant to
providing the means that allow for organizational expansion. While it appears that this
topic derivates from the research question it picks up the where the analysis of KfR fails
to provide sufficient evidence of organizational change for the FARC and the Taliban.
With a bevy of financial assets, the FARC and the Taliban were able to attract new
recruits, develop their material capabilities, and ideological cleavages that did not
drastically alter their fundamental makeup. This discussion of funding sources will arise
again in Chapter Four.

. Article 1 of that convention states that “[a]ny person who seizes or detains or threatens to kill,
to injure or to threaten to detain another person (hereafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel
a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or Juridical
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the hostage commits the offense of taking of hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of
this Convention.“
11

12

. See supra note 1, 25.
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Some related questions that this thesis will answer to help us understand dark
networks that commit acts of terror are: Does organizational behavior change as a
group matures tactically? Boyns and Ballard (2004) were the first to recognize the
importance of human capital to terrorist organizations because knowledge, training, and
skill are required to build complex bombs logistically coordinate attacks on convoys.13 In
their 2008 paper that explores the lethality of terrorism, Asal and Rethemeyer test six
hypotheses related to the organizational aspects of terrorism in which they quantitatively
test for human capital in dozens of terrorist organizations.14 To measure this variable
they use quantity of members as a proximate for human capital, because the authors
believe that as the number of members in a terrorist group increases so does the
number of individuals who have advanced training useful for attacks. In this paper I will
use their same logic of number of members in a terrorist organization in what I call
organization maturity, i.e. the greater number of well-trained members a group acquires,
the more mature it becomes. Why do groups choose to practice political kidnapping
instead of kidnapping for ransom or vice versa? Of secondary importance I will also
explore: If there is empirical evidence supporting an effective strategy to counter
kidnapping such as a refusal to pay captives’ ransoms? Are there more recent
developments in the practice of kidnappings from this century than in its “heyday” from
the 1960s to 1990s? For instance, are kidnappings conducted by ISIS or the Taliban of
journalists and civilians different from those of earlier decades?

13
. David Boyns and James David Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical
Understanding of Terrorism,” American Sociologist 35, no. 2, (2004): 14.
14

. See supra note 6, 439.
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This research is important because it looks inside the black box of extremist
groups to understand the particular aspects of how they operate, which will allow
policymakers to tailor more precise response to acts of terror. Jacob N. Shapiro (2005a,
2005b, 2006, 2010) in particular has conducted years of research focused on funding
and inner operations of terror networks. Knowledge of a terror group’s organizational
structure may lead to predicting how to counter violent acts and increase the likelihood
fewer people will be abducted in the future. No less important than the organizational
aspect is the financial one to the goal of combating global terrorism. in recent years
policy makers have paid attention to minimizing KfR as a method to shrink the financial
support for terrorist organizations, particularly as their nationals have been abducted
abroad. In addition to more practical deductions one can gain from this research,
learning more about organizational structures of “dark networks” is beneficial because
they are among the key non-state institutions, together with NGOs and MNCs, that
compete with states for influence in the globalized society of the 21 st century.
Readers familiar with literature on terrorism know that scores of definitions of
terrorism exist. One widely accepted definition is Hoffman’s (2006) who notes five
criteria: (1) political aims or motives by the perpetrator, (2) violence or threatening
violence, (3) induces psychological repercussions of fear or terror beyond a particular
attack, (4) conducted by an organization or individual, (5) perpetrated by a sub-national
group or non-state entity.15 These conditions distinguish terrorism from other acts of
violence or other groups involved in illegal activity. This last point excludes the
possibility of state terrorism, which is problematic when discussing some violent acts by

15

. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York City: Colombia University Press, 1998), 40.
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governments. Without a classification for acts of terror committed by states - such as
the Saudi Air Force indiscriminately bomb Yemeni civilians in the Yemeni Civil War – we
venture towards bias in favor of state action and possibly ignore the seriousness of that
type of violence. For the purposes of this research such a disagreement can be set
aside because the topic of state terrorism will not be addressed here.
A defining characteristic of kidnapping is that the victim and perpetrators are
concealed until a resolution, either positive or negative, occurs – normally outside of the
public eye. Despite there being many forms of kidnapping, the two necessary elements
of kidnapping are “human life and the hostage as carrier of symbolic capital.”16 The
assumption that human life itself is valuable and that its value is undermined when it is
traded for money or symbolic capital by kidnappers. “Symbolic capital” is what
kidnappers aim to receive through committing the act. Although demands vary from
monetary, social, e.g. equal rights for a disenfranchised ethnic group, or political, e.g.
the release from prison of comrades the acquisition of these things increases the
prestige of the perpetrators. Many forms of kidnap exist that range from bride
kidnapping (wherein a man kidnaps a woman he wishes to marry an old custom that still
occurs in some parts of the world to tiger kidnappings when someone is forcibly taken
and obligated to commit a crime themselves.17 Bride kidnapping is in fact unique
because its primary goal is not economic or political and could be described as an
abduction because the targeted individual is intended to stay with her captor long-term.

16
. Rodanthi Tzanelli, “Capitalizing On Value: Towards a Sociological Understanding of
Kidnapping,” Sociology (2006): 935.

. “Pair escape ‘tiger kidnap’ ordeal,” BBC News (London, UK). July 28, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6920668.stm
17
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The types of kidnapping commonly recognized by business scholars,
criminologists, and political scientists can be distinguished by either the economic or
political motivations of the abductors, and these are the two categories pertinent to this
study. Ransom monies acquired from KfR enable terrorist groups to pursue many
activities including:
“recruit and indoctrinate new members, acquire sophisticated weapons and
communications gear such as satellite phones, establish training camps and support
units, including “safe houses” and transportations operations, as well as provide
financial resources which can be used to bribe government officials law enforcement
personnel who can be of use to a terrorist organization in conducting its nefarious
activities.”18
Economic motivated kidnappings seek money in exchange for a person’s release
whereas politically motivated kidnappings seek symbolic capital through political
concessions, like the release of fellow combatants from an enemy prison.19 These are
generalities and in reality nearly all cases of KfR are composed of a financial if not
economic element—the difference being the scale of income gained but also the
motivations of the hostage takers as well. Indeed, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) is estimated to have amassed at least $65 million between 2005 and 2011 from
kidnappings alone.20 Between 2008 and 2009 the average price for a hostage’s ransom
was $6.5 million.21
Two important ideas to remember about kidnappings are (1) there is a financial
factor present in all cases and (2) the sociopolitical status of the hostage is important

18

. See supra note 1, 26.

19

. Rachel Briggs, The Kidnapping Business (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2001), 61.

20

. See supra note 1, 26.

21

. See supra note 1, 26.
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with respect to the ransom payment.22 This has led some, including Turner, to assert
that there is no meaningful distinction between political and economic kidnapping
despite the motivations of the perpetrators, because the economic and political are
always interacting – fogging rigid typologies.23 Although this position does cloud
typologies of kidnappings as essentially for financial or political objectives, I think Turner
is essentially correct in his assessment. Monetary or political motives for kidnapping are
useful ways to study the phenomenon yet in the real-world things are rarely so clear and
these classifications are not meant to be iron laws. When An additional way to help us
clearly think about kidnap for ransom (KfR) is the definition utilized by the Global
Terrorism Database which identifies terrorism as: (1) intentional acts, (2) practice of
violence of the threat of violence, (3) propagated by a sub-national group, (4) directed at
accomplishing a political, economic, religious, or social goal, (5) is aimed at targeting a
larger audience, and finally (6) outside the context of legitimate warfare.24 This criteria of
what constitutes terrorism is different from Hoffman’s definition above but it illustrates
how a kidnapping can be an act of terror and not violent crime. Abducted persons taken
for political reasons may have a symbolic status or be valuable in their own right, and
their kidnapping is used to bring attention to an issue important to a group. Other times
people are taken for immediate monetary purposes that may serve long-term political
goals.

22

. See supra note 15, 932.
. Mark Turner, “Kidnapping and Politics” International Journal of the Sociology of Law (1998):

23

146.
. Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” START University of
Maryland, last modified July 2018, 10.
24
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The two main types of goals of the kidnappings that armed groups conduct are
political and financial. Kidnappers will abduct those from a variety of backgrounds e.g.,
rich, poor, urban, rural, male, female, so long as a ransom can be paid, and there is no
objective by the kidnapper besides monetary gain for the use of the organization.25
Naturally, foreigners often make for high value targets due to their relative wealth
compared to locals in less developed nations yet in some nations kidnapping of locals
make up as high as 90 percent of all crimes annually.26 However, in Nigeria and South
Africa between 1985 and 2000 kidnapped locals constituted only 20 to 40 percent of the
total due the high level of poverty in those nations over this time, according to Briggs.27
Some writers describe kidnap for ransom as a business, not simply because there is
financial motive for this action but also because it requires complex organizational
structures.28 Victims of political kidnappings are normally targeted individually and held
for a multitude of objectives like vengeance, raising awareness to a group’s cause, or to
create a climate of fear in a target population.
The etymology of the word kidnap can be traced to 17th-century Britain, when
children were taken in the night for ransom. Impressment of American sailors into
service by the Royal Navy was a prime reason for the United States to declare war
against Great Britain in 1812. Kidnappings in the 20 th century gained worldwide
prominence during the 1960s in Latin America, spread to Europe in the 1970s, then to
25
. See chapters three and five for discussions on target selection and the behavior of Kidnappers
towards their victims.
26

. See supra note 20, 19.

27

. See supra note 20, 20.

. Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in Networks and Netwars, eds. John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001).
28
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the Middle East in 1980s. More recently kidnappings reached epic levels in Chechnya
and American occupied Iraq. This paper will not consider hostage situations, in which
victims are seized but held in public, or hijackings, when many victims are held often on
an aircraft or bus.

1.3 Objectives, Methodology, and Materials
In this work the author will use theories of organizational behavior to understand
if and how kidnappings by armed groups affect the organizational structure of such
groups. The author will explore several themes related to the tactic of kidnap for
ransom, broader themes of financing, and use examples of groups that follow such
patterns to support these claims. This work explores the ways armed groups change
organizationally over a long period of time. Some groups among those studied have
different objectives that highlight differences between political kidnappings and
kidnappings for ransom which, it is thought, shape organizational structures.
The author will answer the research questions mentioned above by means of the
comparative method. The comparative method is typically imagined in one of two ways:
either as the way to describe political or social systems or as means of informing about
a process, the goal of which is to solve research puzzles that cannot be solved without
comparing and logical reasoning.29 Comparative case studies range from the smallest
single case study during a set time period when many variables can be studied to the
largest study of all relevant cases over all time and space focusing on only a small
number of variables, e.g. pooled time series analysis. A single case study is not
29

. Paul Pennings, Hans Kerman, and Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science,
Second Edition (London: Sage Publications, 2006) 19-20.

12
explicitly comparative but may still implicitly be so, and it has the advantage of providing
greater detail. Sometimes these are called “thick cases” and when a deviant example is
considered it can help generate theories about what makes it an exception to the rule.
At its broadest, a comparative study encompassing all possible germane cases has the
obvious value of casting a wide net, yet it may have the shortfall of treating time as a
constant variable.30 When choosing among approaches one must balance between a
large number of cases with a few common variables versus control over a smaller
number of cases that allow for a larger number of variables under consideration. A
middle way between these extremes, which is used in this study, is to analyze two or
more cases in a set time period normally before and/or after a specific event such as an
economic crisis or political transformation. This approach has the benefit of a focused
comparison derived from the research question.
The logic of comparison is closely related to the issue of inquiry (what is studied)
and unit of observation (what object is considered in studying a phenomenon) that is
traced back to John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who developed the ‘most similar’ and ‘most
different’ tools of comparative research commonly used by students and scholars. What
today we call MSSD (most similar system design) and MDSD (most different system
design) aid researchers by easily allowing them to recognize what traits are similar and
dissimilar respectively among cases in order to isolate pertinent factors for study and
cancel-out the noise of differing case contexts. This work utilizes a MDSD across a
diachronic time span with temporally diverse locations of Colombia and Afghanistan.

30

. Ibid, 22.
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Once one knows what to compare and why the next steps executed should
create a design that helps the researcher answer their primary question. Asking oneself
a series of questions will lead to the most direct and best possible way to solve a
research question. Pennings, Kerman, and Kleinnijenhuis (2006) suggest four questions
to lead scholars through what can be a confusing process to understanding how an
effective study should look. First, what political concepts, e.g. actors, institutions,
processes, are imbedded in the question? This question sets researchers on the road of
theory seeking evidence to support it that results in a logical interpretation by
researchers.31 Secondly, how well do the theoretical concepts “travel”, i.e. faithfully
comparable from one system to another in a way that supports internal and external
validity?32 33 Thirdly, what are possible cases that could shed light on the research
question? Lastly, how does the researcher account for time, i.e. synchronic or
diachronic, and space, i.e. where does this case take place, when selecting case(s) for
observation? Finally, the researcher may decide to use many or few cases and then a
MSSD or MDSD. In summary scholars must follow a series of steps in order to create
the best possible organization design that answers his or her research question.
To test these hypotheses, the author will compare two case studies. The strength
of the case study is the detail it provides a complex social phenomenon in context that

31

. Ibid, 44.

32
. David Collier, “The Comparative Method” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed.
A.W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1993), 108.
33

. Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, Second Edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 70.
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illuminate the theoretical issues studied.34 A case study is a research strategy, not a
methodology where context is deliberately included among variables that place
emphasis on understanding processes. Due to the multitude of data available in a case,
researchers need to construct a sound theoretical framework to cut through extraneous
information that may lead a study off track. Without a focused theoretical framework, a
case study may exhume interesting descriptive information without any wider
significance. Theory-building by case study tends to be inductive, like the work of a
detective who must piece together evidence to understand all relevant aspects of a
crime and discard superfluous information.35
The independent variable that will be attempted to isolate is kidnapping/drug
trafficking and the dependent variable is organizational structure. Such cases selected
here are of two well-known organizations. First, featuring the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist oriented insurgency connected to the
Colombian Communist Party (PCC) that fought the Colombian government for over 50
years for greater income equality and broader rights over their land. Second, the Afghan
Taliban (Taliban), not to be confused with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TPP) a separate
but associated group of the Afghan Taliban, is a hard-line Islamist organization that
practices an austere form of Sunni Islam alien to many Muslims, but which governed
Afghanistan from 1996 when they nominally won the Afghan Civil War to 2001 at which
point they were overthrown by a NATO coalition led by the United States. These groups

. Jean Hartley, “Case Study Research” in Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in
Organizational Research, eds. Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon (Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage
Publications, 2004), 323.
34

35

. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods 2nd Edition, (Thousand Oakes, CA:
Sage Publications, 1994),

15
have disparate ideologies, the FARC are Marxist-Leninist and the Taliban Islamic
fundamentalist; additionally, they operate in radically differ diverse environments
northern South American and South Asia but similar temporal spaces of the late 20 th
century through early 21st century. Among various other tactics of terrorism both groups
are well known for their publicized kidnappings. With respect the kidnappings examined
in this work both local and foreign hostages will be considered. Both sets are vital for
telling a comprehensive narrative on the phenomenon although for the sake of the
argument in Chapter Four those cases will focus on foreigners. These individuals do get
a lot of the international media attention and their captivity is often more significant to
international affairs. This being said, to ignore the kidnappings of locals, that in most
locations and times compose the majority of cases would be to deny the context of the
problem and pain an overly occidental picture that is inaccurate.
Due to the well-publicized condition of both organizations primary sources are
necessary for this research to make any claims beyond generalities.
Conducting interviews with those who were kidnapped or members or former members
of terrorist groups is unrealistic so primary sources will need to come from news articles,
interviews, or memoirs/autobiographies. Secondary sources are also employed to
explore organizational behavior theory and the histories of the two groups. I will
examine data by searching for changes in patters of kidnapping practice and
organizational practice with attention to specific events that could show causality of an
organizational change after the adoption of new tactics.

16
1.4 Outline
The plan for the remainder of this work is as follows: A comprehensive literature
review in Chapter Two will explore topics relevant to group behavior, structures, and the
theoretical roles groups play for healthy human behavior. Armed group organization
patterns can skew hierarchical to the point of leadership by a dictatorial leader or as
decentralized as a lone wolf who may or gain inspiration through the Internet from
organizations with which he or she is unassociated. It will conclude by exploring
boundaries of research on kidnap for ransom and what is lacking in this discourse.
Chapter Three will seek to understand why terrorist organizations decide to kidnap
for ransom. It could be that kidnapping with political motivations will achieve different
goals. There is some disagreement amongst writers on how to categorize different
forms of kidnapping and where meaningful differences exist. Some questions that this
chapter will ask are: What factors might influence a group to practice this tact rather
than car bombings or target assassinations? Are there environmental or time factors
that prompt groups to implement this use of force? This chapter focuses the reader’s
attention to kidnapping by telescoping from a broad view of armed group target
selection through the lens of ideology to a narrower focus terrorist target selection
based on strategy finally arriving at what makes kidnap for ransom appealing as a tactic
of terrorism.
By observing two case studies Chapter Four will address the main research question
posed above: Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of
armed groups? At first glance, it would seem the answer would be negative - but we
cannot know for certain until the data has been examined. The results that this author

17
observed were not what was hypothesized and the causal mechanism of KfR did not
have the explanatory power that was anticipated. Generally, the greatest changes
observed in both groups that took place in the FARC and the Taliban were in their ability
to continue their struggle against the enemy; the ideological change of its members, or
what might be called drift. Some less significant developments resulted in either
organization too.
Finally, Chapter Five concludes this study by inquiring about the prevalence of
kidnap for ransom of foreigners, which makes international headlines and whether it is
an act of terror that should concern societies. In response to this small but not
insignificant threat, should states encourage or discourage ransom payments to
abductors to free abductees? These two areas represent the current lines of inquiry into
research on kidnapping; therefore, it is fitting to end this study here. A concluding
section will summarize the most important findings uncovered in this work and suggest
additional areas of research scholars may explore.
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Chapter Two
Review of Literature

This chapter will develop the theoretical basis for the organizational framework of
armed groups from their topmost level of leadership to the bottommost cellular level. It
will begin with an examination of the importance of groups to human society and wellbeing. Later, the discussion will move to the intricate and murky world of financing of
terrorism. The application for this exploration is utilized in Chapter Five, which focuses
on implication of paying kidnappers’ ransom and how states have reacted against their
countrymen’s kidnappings. Finally, the last section of this chapter will explore the
practical matter of the procedure of a kidnapping and the modius operand of
perpetrators.
2.1 The Fundamental Elements of Groups
Shapiro identifies three dimensions of organizational design within covert
networks for the purpose of comparing networks with one another. The three
dimensions he identifies are: interconnectedness, hierarchy, and specialization.36
Degree centrality – “or the average number of connections to an individual in a network”
– is one method to measure interconnectedness. For example:

…consider two networks, Network A is a network of four cells of size six
and one or two outside connections per cell. Network B is a cellular network with
six cells of size four and two outside connections per cell. By most reckoning,
network B would seem more interconnected, yet the mean degree centrality of
the Network A is higher, 5.3 for Network A vs. 3.5 for Network B.
36. Jacob N. Shapiro, “Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations,”
(Unpublished working paper, Stanford, CA, 2005), 7.
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We can determine by the outcome of Network A as more connected that this
measurement favors dense connectedness within cells.
A group is three or more people working together to achieve a task, so group
dynamics refer to the set of relationships of those in any group. They are the building
blocks of many terror groups, businesses, political parties, or other successful
cooperative ventures. Groups exist to fulfill six human needs: (1) inclusion with a
community, (2) a need to give and receive love, (3) to exert power over others, (4) a
need to communicate and alleviate stressful situations, (5) for enjoyment and to have
fun, and (6) a need to communicate to lower anxiety.37 An aggregate, or several people
in the same location and time not devoted to a task is not a group. For example, there is
a difference between volunteers working on a political campaign and an audience
watching two candidates debate in an auditorium. Another important difference between
a group and an aggregate of people is that groups are interdependent. Interdependence
arises when the members of a group are working together on a common task.
Several features contribute to a group’s successful accomplishment of its goals.
Without observing basic norms, a group cannot effectively operate, but following norms
is not sufficient for success. Norms are established standard expectations of attitude
that direct behavior of a majority of members that must be observed.38 Group
commitment of a member to his or her comrades and to the values and mission are vital

37. Scott A. Myers and Carolyn M. Anderson, The Fundamentals of Small Group Communication
(Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage, 2008), 10.
38. James H. Davis, Group Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969) 82.
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for cohesion and are composed of three types: emotional, intellectual, and moral.39 A
certain amount of trust is essential with any relationship. In terms of group dynamics
without trust new members cannot be accepted into a group and little work could be
done because members would act alone. Once trust is established support can grow so
that members of a group may rely on one another for positive psychological
reinforcement during times of emotional stress or material scarcity.
Social identity theory (SIT) analyzes interactions between in-groups and outgroups postulating that individuals enhance their views of themselves by comparisons
with an out-group, which has value and emotional significance to group membership.
Self-classification with a group increases the value one ascribes to themselves, and
increases the defensiveness one feels when their group is attacked.40 When a valued
social group is perceived to be attacked, e.g. an attack on a national or religious activity,
then those who share that group identity tend to hold negative views of the outside
aggressor group. Once a member has internalized the group identity an assault against
the wider group is perceived as an assault on the particular member.41 This theory is
based on the assumption that in-groups view out-groups as inferior to them or in
competition with them.

39. Natalie J. Allen and John P. Myer, “The Measurements and Antecedents of Affective
Continuance and Normative Commitment to the Organization,” Journal of Occupational Psychology 63,
(1990): 2.
40. Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole, 1979), 33-47.
41. Brooke M. Rogers, et al, “The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in Terrorism Violence: A
Social Psychological Analysis,” International Review of Psychology 19, no. 3 (2006).
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Formalization as identified by organization theorists is “the extent to which rules,
procedures, instructions and communications are written, and the degree to which rules
are explicitly defined.”42 A high level of formalization prescribes the behavior of group
members, clear communications, quality control of operations, well-defined roles and
tasks, and develops SOPs to diminish uncertainty. 43 Behavior of members, can be
regulated three ways. (1) Positional formalization of behavior relating to a job
description can stipulate qualifications one must possess to in order to qualify for a
position. (2) Work flow behavioral formalization reminds individuals of specific tasks
they are required to complete. (3) Rules based behavioral formalization, for instance
this might be a code of conduct individuals must follow to stay in good standing as
member to their organization. Strong formalization moderates what might otherwise be
unpredictable relationships when group members unfamiliar with each other meet; this
in turn fosters institutional memory. Longer institutional memory helps groups avoid
mistakes made in the past; it aids groups’ effectiveness by allowing them to recognize
patterns over time through multiple interactions with outsiders or within their
organization. The terrorist’s dilemma hinders formalization as standard operating
procedures (SOPs) become more predictable and regular counterterrorism (CT) officers
can more easily detect the patterns of groups via their communications and repeated
behavioral patterns.44

42. Brecht Volders, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat: Impact of the Group’s Organizational
Design?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 2, (2016): 114.
43. Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 33-39.
44. See supra note 8, 115.
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The structure of any terrorist group is molded by that group’s necessity to secure
itself from CT authorities of the state and its desire to effectively implement its attacks,
which are often competing objectives. Most of the previous research conducted on
terrorist organizational structure covers single case studies despite large open-source
datasets such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).45

2.2 Organizational Structure and Leadership Style in Terrorist Organizations
An organizational structure is another variable in the equation of a successful
terror attack. It is an intangible structure of people consisting of lines of authority and
communication that attract and train new recruits, raise revenue, conduct operations,
and compete with rivals. Successful organizations learn and adapt to new challenges
and no matter their field or industry act as a force multiplier whereas poor organizations
are chaotic, prone to making mistakes, and are at a greater likelihood of being taken
over by rivals. The standard way of viewing groups that commit terror is through a
hieratical or horizontal structure but other typologies persist. Jackson distinguishes
among networks, groups, and movements while Kilberg separates among all-channel,
market, hub-spoke, or bureaucracy types of groups that commit acts of terror.
With respect to hierarchy, organization charts can hide the true nature of an
organization’s hierarchy. Given that in reality we can say a group is hierarchical if those
who provide a political and ideological vision also exercise operational direction. 46 The
aspects that leadership controls are twofold. Firstly, the specific operational elements
45. Peter Neumann et al., “Locating Al Qaeda’s Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 9, (2011):
46. See supra note 2, 11.
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that includes targeting, planning, and execution of a covert act. Secondly, the logistics,
procurement of materiel, and financial and accounting features require supporting
covert acts, so the two types of control are operational control and resourceful control.
Shapiro identifies four features of operational control or resource control he claims
classify an organization’s hierarchy:
•
•

•

•

An organization is centralized when the center directly controls
operations and resources.
An organization is de facto centralized when either (1) the center
controls resources, delegates operations, but has a credible
anility to monitor operations and withhold resources if operations
are not carried out to its liking; or (2) the center controls
operations, delegates resource procurement, but has a credible
ability to engage in violence against factions.
An organization is de facto decentralized when either: (1) the
center controls resources, delegates operations, but does not
have a credible ability to monitor operations; or (2) the center
controls operations, delegates resource procurement, but does
not have a credible ability to engage in violence against factions.
In tis case, control is exercised only at the whim of the factions.
An organization is decentralized when the center provides only
ideological guidance and cells self-fund or coordinate among
themselves regarding operations and resources.

Hierarchical structures consist of a large base of support culminating with a small
pinnacle of leaders subdivided by increasingly small strata of order. Fraser and Fulton
say terror organizations have four levels. At the top the smallest level of commanders
draft strategy and provide vision and guidance, but it is difficult for them to communicate
with their subordinates so they little direct daily supervision over the group’s activities.47
Just below the commanders is the active cadre who actually perpetrate acts of terror
and who are normally skilled in one area attack, e.g. bomb making or computer hacking

47. Jonathan Matusitz, Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Review (Thousand Oakes, CA:
Sage, 2013), 282.
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and have their own subordinates that support their work. Active supporters, who
Matusitz claims are the most important strata of the hieratical structure because
successful attacks cannon occur without the logistical support, safe houses, or money
raised by them, work directly under cadre members. On bottom is the largest group
called passive supporters who are difficult to identify because they do not always openly
support terror groups, yet they are nevertheless essential for a climate of political
success that accepts the ideas and worldview of terror groups.
In the past two decades terrorist networks have taken on an increasingly
decentralized and horizontal shape. Most terror groups number fifty or fewer members,
so they lack the expertise and manpower to pull off sophisticated attacks beyond soft
targets with minimal security. Hamas is an example of a horizontal group in which
members are selected to participate in an attack based on that individual’s expertise to
complete a task. It is also common for cells in horizontal networks to operate openly in
mosques and other social gatherings while other cells operate more covertly – a
phenomenon known as special differentiation.48
Decentralization has costs and benefits associated with that variety of
organizational design. Indeed, a decentralized organization has an advantage over the
hierarchical or centralized organization with respect to evading CT authorities due to
their more numerous links between cells than a top-down structure.49 On the other
hand, decentralized groups face principal-agent problems when, for example, cell
leaders ignore the orders of the center, or when leaders at the highest levels do not
have the same understanding as leaders on the ground regarding the situation at the
48. Ibid, 282.
49. Paul R. Pilar. “Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3, (2004):
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grass-roots level. The disconnect between a terrorist organization and the population
they claim to support can and does have negative effects in their campaigns at times
“confusing tactical success for strategic achievements”. Fewer connections between
cells restricts the capability for problem solving of unexpected tribulations by low-level
commanders that force extra mental demands upon senior commanders.50
Leadership style may be classified in two categories of authoritarian or
charismatic. Authoritarian leaders exert strong control over the organization they direct
through strong-arm tactics and a tight organizational structure with closed decision
making. Outside of the small cadre of leadership lower strata of members have little say
regarding the goals or strategies of their group; moreover, this may lead to close
mindedness and groupthink by a leadership that can lead to rash thinking and mistakes
made. Powerful authoritarian leaders commonly use punishment and fear to enforce
their decisions, which discourages factionalism. Active supporters under authoritarian
leadership regularly receive military style training to promote discipline among the ranks
and to develop recruits’ basic fighting skills. Well-known examples of groups under
authoritarian leadership are the PIRA and the Red Army Faction (RAF).
Some scholars have compared terror groups with charismatic leaders to cults
that rely upon the personality of a single inspiring leader who is normally a gifted
communicator or a brilliant strategist. According to Durkheim,51 a cult is a group of
people organized around shared ideas and solidified by traditions and rituals – indeed a
broad definition. It is possible for the charismatic leader to attract numerous followers

50. Jay R. Galbraith. “Organizational Design: An Information Processing View.” Interfaces, 4,
(1974):
51. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
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but his or her greatest strength is also the terror group’s greatest weakness. When such
a leader is no longer in charge due to death, capture, or a change in his or her beliefs
such a group may fall apart because of the centrality of the one who is no longer
present. Charismatic leaders possess many of the same traits of: intelligence, ability to
harness emotion to effectively communicate an inspiring message, decisiveness,
adaptability, and levelheadedness under stress. Two examples of terror groups that are
characterized as having charismatic leaders are the PKK once led by Abdullah Öcalan
and al-Qaeda partly founded by Osama bin Laden.
In addition to the qualities of a charismatic leader he or she performs roles that
distinguish them from an authoritarian leader that when harnessed are powerful tools for
motivation. Heads of personality cults appear larger than life to their followers who may
inspire worship for members; consequently, the teachings of such as person are taken
unequivocally as truth. A leader as a positive role model improves the self-image and
legitimacy of a terror group’s cause for which it struggles. Storytelling can add a
mystique to the past exploits of a group that can help them become folk heroes, or it
can create an inspiring vision of the future once the group’s goals are attained. These
features of the charismatic leader assist to draw in passive and active supporters
adding to the rank that in turn legitimizes that group.
In order for a terrorist group to implement KfR on a large scale over an extended
period of time, a well-organized structure must exist. If, for instance, a terrorist
organization is diversifying into KfR when they already have experience in human
trafficking or smuggling, it will be easier to modify preexisting procedures, tactics, and
supply chain for this purpose. There are a number of physical and conceptual
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similarities between human trafficking, smuggling, and kidnap for ransom. All three
activities require differentiated cells to execute the specialized activities required for a
successful completion of an operation. For instance, these activities necessitate guards,
drivers, money handlers, surveillance teams, and storage facilities or safe houses,
however the emphasis on each role may differ based on whether a group is smuggling,
kidnapping, or human trafficking.52 Still, the physicality of taking, holding, and hiding
people is similar in all three cases, so there is not a great deal of difference between the
misdeeds practically.
Small groups do not have the expertise of their larger counterparts that can train
their members for specified duties. A small group will likely have better success with
KfR in a politically and socially insecure environment where authorities are not trusted
by the populace either because the authorities are ineffective or corrupt. For instance,
following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and the dismantling of
the Iraqi armed forces, that allowed the country to descend into a chaos where
widespread KfR was possible. At that time, small, unorganized criminal gangs took
advantage of an unstable environment to exploit unprotected citizens for easy monetary
gain. Sometimes, hostages would then be sold to insurgent groups too.53 This is how
common street gangs can work with insurgents and armed groups in a convoluted
nexus of crime and terrorism for political and financial advantage.

52. Everard Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom,” in The Faces of Terrorism: A
Multidisciplinary Perspective, ed. David Canter (Chichester West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
187-207.
53. Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,”
The National Interest, 81, 2005, 4.
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2.3 The Significance of Cells to “New Terrorism” Organizations
Cells are the building blocks of many modern day organizations, which were
introduced by the IRA after Michael Collins studied terrorist tactics of the 18th and 19th
centuries.54 There is no set configuration of cell organization or hierarchy, yet they
consist of a small subset of an organization designated for a particular mission and are
cordoned off from other cells in their vicinity.55 This decentralized organizational
characteristic represents one feature of ‘new terrorism’. That is, a horizontal body of
networks sometimes without a central leadership as opposed to a top-down hierarchy.56
Overall, the Taliban displays more features new terrorism features than the FARC that
should be considered an ‘old’ terrorist group. Isolation of cells is a strength of their
design because if one cell is eliminated it cannot offer any information regarding the
activities of its neighbors to CT authorities. It is not uncommon for cells to have a
detached connection to its leadership, which practically means that the details of its
planned mission are at the discretion of cell members. More autonomous cells are
sometimes called sleeper cells especially when they are located in a foreign state. A
notable feature of the cell is its clandestine nature that protects it against recognition by
enemy organizations and is designed to impart fear into the target population who is

54. See supra note 13, 296.
55. Jonathan R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security (7th ed.). (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
2011).
56. According to Kurtulus there are four primary features of new terrorism: 1 A less-obvious
political motivation that is more religious in nature; 2 a decentralized organization structure or ‘non-group’
groups; a greater amount of violence that is less discriminate than in the past; the intention to use and
ability to acquire WMDs.
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unaware when or if an attack will happen.57 Three obstacles exist in identifying
clandestine cells: (1) missing information about intent, target, and timing; (2) identifying
who is and is not a member of the cell; (3) keeping track of the moves of the cell that
are constantly morphing.
Clandestine activities foster stronger bonds of trust and support as an “us versus
them” attitude, which develops in addition to the defensive position secrecy offers.
Members of the cell frequently recruit from among their personal connection to preserve
the bonds of loyalty established in the cell. This severely limits the number of potential
newcomers who will likely join yet this aversion to open enlistment of those not in
members’ social circle guards from the potential detection and elimination of the cell.58
Sleeper cells, those that lay dormant but become active at a predetermined time or by
its own determination, may or may not be clandestine once active in the target
community.
Self-starter cells are a newer innovation to the terrorist group family that unlike
other cell forms has little or no connection to the original organization. Individuals who
belong to this type of terror cell are often called amateurs and when a group that
commits an act of terror, like al-Qaeda for example, has many self-starter cells it is said
to be franchising. A cause for the proliferation of franchises is the ease of
communication available through the Internet both through the worldwide continuous
coverage of terror groups via the news and the ability of extremists to spread their

57. Matenia P. Sirseloudi, “How to Predict the Unpredictable: On the Early Detection of Terrorist
Campaigns.” Defense and Security Analysis 21, no. 4 (2005).
58. Bonnie H. Erikson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure.” Social Forces 60, no. 1 (1981).
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message through social media, online propaganda, and digital publications that glorify
violence and extremist ideologies.
Since the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent dismantling of centralized
al-Qaeda self-starter cells have been a foremost concern to policymakers in North
America and Western Europe. Evidently these fears have not been unwarranted due to
the number of high-profile attacks since the early 2000s including Madrid 2004, London
2005, and many others around the globe. Decentralization of terror networks has the
potential for greater danger than more traditional forms of small groups of extremists
because they do not need to travel in order to receiving training, do not need to
communicate with known individuals who are identified as dangerous to state
governments, they receive less suspicion because they are commonly citizens of the
target state, they can easily target soft targets, e.g. cinemas, schools.
Terrorism, as in crime, is not always a group activity. Individuals who commit acts
of terror alone are called lone wolves because they work alone and are not directed by
central leadership. Despite their perceived individuality lone wolves are normally
inspired by the goals of a group or its ideology. Lone wolves idealistically or naïvely
believe their violent actions will further a righteous cause against a wicked or ignorant
society despite overwhelming odds against them. Hoffman 59 makes a distinction
between lone wolf terrorism and individuals who are sometimes called lunatic
assassins. Those two categories of attackers may use similar tactics and target the
same people (students at a university or a celebrity); although, they have different
purposes

59. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 42.
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Successfully orchestrating a terrorist campaign requires coordinating many
specialized tasks including: fundraising, intelligence gathering, weapons knowledge,
recruiting new members, public and media relations, and security. For this reason, basic
levels of interconnectedness and hierarchy must be present and a group operating in
the proper environment fertile to terror campaigns. Specialization refers to the range of
tasks a cell is expected to complete.60 A number of constraints exist on specialization;
for example, in the decentralized organization if interconnectedness is sufficiently high
and multiple secure communication lines occur where group members can plan attacks
with reasonable certainty their conversations will not be detected. Greater hierarchical
organizations with lower levels of interconnectedness can nevertheless specialize if
group leaders efficiently allocate resources without arousing detection from security
authorities. Low-level specialization is possible in any organizational form, but may also
lead to corruption within the group limiting the goals of its aims.61 When
interconnectedness is limited among specialized groups, communication is retarded and
ultimately the ability to exchange ideas and learn from past mistakes made by other
cells. The difficulty with studying specialization is that in the literature a distinction is not
normally
Organizations must be concerned with the space and time in which they operate
in addition to their structural design or leadership. Working in conjunction with
environmental factors can make a crucial difference between success and failure for
any group. For terrorist organizations this means coming to grips with normally

60. See supra note 2, 13.
61. See supra note, 14.

32
operating in a hostile environment. Yet, sometimes it can mean taking advantage of a
space with limited government presence or that is governed poorly where they can raise
funds, plan operations, or train recruits in relative safety.62 Face-to-face interactions
generate higher levels of trust among members and commanders can more easily
control their subordinates. However, the greater the amount of space and longer the
time a terror group operates the more it exposes itself to CT measures by governments.
Complex operations that require many months of planning and frequent communication
between members pose a hindrance to the relative security of an organization and
place greater stress on operational space and time. This inherently increases the
probability of detection or leaks. Knowing these things makes the 9/11 hijacking all the
more impressive, because training and planning for that operation took over a year, and
meetings were conducted around the world.

2.4 The Financing of Terrorism
Financing of terrorism is a murky and convoluted subject that combines funding
sources, funding methods, and funding channels which often traverse states and
include legal and illegal activities. Money is the blood that runs through the body of the
terrorist organization delivering nutrients to all extremities and inner organs. Ramzi
Yusef, the man convicted for attacking the World Trade Center in 1993, admitted had he
had the suitable funds he could have built the bomb he intended to bring down the twin
towers.63 Since the recognition of transnational terrorism, especially after 9/11, terrorism

62. “Countries Report on Terrorism” (U.S. Department of State 2013), 236
63. Matthew A. Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of
International Affairs 6, no. 4 (2002): 2.
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financing has become a significant source of interest for policy makers and researchers.
According to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, funds for terrorism are: “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible,
moveable or immovable, however acquired, or legal documents or instruments in any
form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets,
including, but not limited to, bank credits, travelers checks, money orders, shares,
securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.” 64 This is obviously a vast category of financial
instruments.
As mentioned above, a feature of New Terrorism is its generally flatter
organizational structure. With respect to financing of their operations cells are expected
to raise a greater share of their own funds. Probably no where do we see a stronger
element of new terrorism in the FARC and Taliban case studies than in the realm of
fundraising. In both cases, although to a different degree, observers can see a generally
decentralized approach to fundraising. For the FARC financial decisions are often but
not exclusively made at the front, or mid-level, of the group. While the Taliban’s district
commanders, mid low-level leaders, normally take a lead in raising and spending
monies. The greatest development in fundraising from older groups to newer ones is
loss of state funding as a primary source of income.65 Groups from the IRA to Hamas
and Hezbollah raised a great deal of their income from Iran, Libya, and Syria; although,
they still participated in criminal activity like armed robbery, KfR, and drug smuggling.66

64. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention. The United Nations (1999)
65. Michele Zanini, “Middle Eastern Terrorism and Netwar,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 22,
no. 3 (1999): 249.
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In particular the Gaddafi regime in Libya suffered for its support of terrorist causes
during the 1980s when two Libyan fighters were shot down by American F-14s and in
another instance when Tripoli was bombed in 1986.67
The relative importance of kidnap for ransom varies across terrorist
organizations, yet it is a consideration when examining terrorist financing. Not only does
this tactic vary across organization, but also by the developmental stage of a group, the
economic environment where they operate, operating costs required for a to function.68
Potential financial and political rewards of a kidnapping must be balanced against the
costs of running the group’s wider operation. Acquiring weapons comes with a danger
and a price as well as the caring for hostages and paying kidnappers and guards. By
way of reducing costs, hostages may be kept in farmhouses, abandoned buildings,
cellars with others captured at different intervals. This was a common observation of
former FARC hostages. In this respect, comparing two similar terrorist organizations
can offer some insight into the differences between groups that do and do not heavily
kidnap.
EU and US government officials estimate, for instance, that al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) likely has a much lower operating costs than other groups
with higher social welfare costs, such as Hamas or Hezbollah; it instead focuses
primarily on operations.69 Efforts to track and prevent funds to AQAP are difficult

66. Jeffrey M. Johnson and Carl Jensen, “The Financing of Terrorism,” The Journal of the
Institute of Justice and International Studies 10 (2010): 104.
67. Ibid, 104.
68. “Organized Maritime Policy and Related Kidnap for Ransom,” FATF Report, (2011): 30.
69. Ibid, 31.
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because monies transmitted frequently and in small amounts transmitted through
discrete hawalas. AQAP does not engage high levels of KfR due to adverse risk factors.
Conversely, EU and US officials agree that KfR is one of AQIM’s primary sources of
income, which is estimated at €15 million annually.70 Increased kidnappings over the
past decade in the African Sahel have provided AQIM with the financial resources to
conduct numerous more operations in North Africa. American officials estimate the
average ransom price per hostage is $1 million that is paid for recruitment,
administrative costs, and operations.71
A unique feature of Islamic terror financing are charities funded through zakat
often translated as almsgiving in English. Zakat as one of the five pillars of the faith is a
fundamental demonstration of righteousness and an ancient method for promoting
economic equality between rich and poor.72 American court records indicate Yassin alQadi, a Saudi businessman who the American government consider a financier of
charity projects and terrorism, moved CHF1.46 million from a Swiss bank account to the
Quranic Literacy Institute of Chicago, which distributes Islamic textbooks.73 According to
the FBI the Quranic Institute purchased property in Woodbridge, Illinois outside of
Chicago in a manner that attempted to hide the source of the money as coming from alQadi International. Furthermore, the U.S. Justice Department claims this property
investment by the Quranic Institute was intended to generate income for a Mohammed

70. Ibid, 31.
71. Ibid, 31.
72. Nimrod Raphaeli, “Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 62.
73. Ibid, 66.

36
Salah, a confessed Hamas operative who was arrested over January 1993 in Israel.74
This case was part of a larger investigation into Mr. al-Qadi’s financial contributions.
Sources of income for financing of terror operations are derived from a variety of
sources of both legitimate and illegitimate means and fronts of businesses and NGOs.
For instance, the gem and precious metals industry can be a shadowy domain for
moving valuable, small, and unmarked commodities across borders. Al-Qaeda heavily
invested in the West African diamond market after its assets were frozen by the
American government in 1998 following the bombing the bombings in Tanzania and
Kenya of US embassies. Established diamond buyers in Sierra Leone and Liberia had
difficulty purchasing products for their costumers because new buyers were paying
between 15 to 30 percent higher for the stones than the market price.75
Funds are raised by other curious means like cigarette smuggling, automobile
resale, credit card fraud, and counterfeiting of consumer products. Two brothers of
Lebanese background were convicted in the United States for reselling cigarettes
across state lines then using the proceeds to purchase military equipment including
night-vision goggles, rife scopes, metal detectors, laser range finders, and others to
Hezbollah associates in Lebanon.76 An official with Interpol testified before the United
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have begun
counterfeiting “Nike shoes, Calvin Klein jeans, and Sony small electronic equipment’, an
innovation in fundraising for terrorism. The commercial cost from breaking intellectual

74. Ibid, 66.
75. Ibid, 74.
76. Ibid, 76.
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property rights was estimated at between $200 and $250 billion annually according to
this same senior official.77 Three Pakistani men and one Saudi man were detained in
Frankfurt Airport by customs officials because they were linked to a scheme whereby
German luxury cars were bought then sold at a considerable markup in Saudi Arabia,
according to the Bundeskriminalamt BKA or German federal police. Furthermore, they
were one of 12 believed money-laundering rings in Germany supporting militant training
camps in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Palestine.78
The hawala is another is another noteworthy financial conduit not only for its
distinctiveness but also for its ubiquity within some Muslim communities. It is the
transfer of money from one agent to another without the use of commercial financial
institutions like banks or money exchange, so in this way it is informal. Hawala literally
translates to remittance in English. They are estimated to move $2 trillion annually
which accounts for only 2 percent of all money moved around the globe.79 However,
more specific data on hawala is largely conjecture.80 What is special about hawalas is
that for consumers they are simple to use, cheaper for moving money than Western
financial institutions, and provide a great deal of anonymity for the consumer because
transactions leave no paper trail. Efforts to regulate these informal wire services have
received some critique from the IMF and other free-market advocates as raising the
cost of business thereby hurting small users.
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Cash couriers are an old profession which have taken on greater importance in
the past several decades as moving money through the international financial system
has become more closely monitored by governments. The same can also be said for
the use of message couriers for a similar reason that electronic communications that
are not encrypted are easily captured by CT authorities with or without the cooperation
of telecom firms. According to a study by the Council on Foreign Relations, the physical
movement of money by couriers is “abetted by weak border controls and a cash-based
culture very unlike the Western credit-and-electronic based economy.81 To illustrate, in
April 2001 a policeman noticed Mohammed Suleiman Vaid attempting to cross the
South Africa-Swaziland border walking awkwardly. Upon searching Mr. Vaid, the officer
discovered five pounds of South African Rand concealed in the man’s underwear. In a
specially made bodysuit under her niqab Mr. Vaid’s wife had the equivalent of $90,000
in Rand.82 It was later uncovered that the man had crossed from South Africa to
Mozambique 150 in the previous 18 months.
As qualitative and quantitative date on the functioning of terrorist organizations
are difficult to acquire, tracing the spending practices of any group is likewise
challenging. Fortunately, it is possible to gain a generalized understanding of the
budgets of some groups from public statements and captured financial documents. The
Afghan Taliban have publicized specifically how ransom money they receive is used in
operations against coalition troops. In an interview conducted by The Telegraph
newspaper with Taliban representatives Mullah Hezbollah said,
81. William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, “Terrorist Financing” Report by Council on Foreign
Relations New York, NY (2002): 16.
82. “Spreading Influence in South Africa, Mounting Evidence of al-Qaeda Links,” The Wall Street
Journal (New York, NY), Dec. 10, 2002.
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“It was a God-sent opportunity. It has helped us to multiply our stockpile of weapons
and explosives to wage battle for at least a year or so.” Mullah Hezbollah continued,
“We were really concerned when we received orders to launch Operation Nursat,
because we had hardly any funds to buy weapons to carry out such a major offence.
Thanks to the ransom payments, however, the operation proceeded with full vigor.”83
Some especially detailed reports come from captured records from al Qaeda in Iraq that
were analyzed by the Rand Corp. Although, this data is specific to AQI, now ISIS, it is
illustrative of the budget of one group that uses KfR as a terror tactic. The budget is as
follows:84

2.5 Opportunity in Civil Conflict
This study relies heavily on the contributions of those who have developed
theories and conducted research in the literature of greed in civil conflicts and civil
conflict economies. People are not regularly considered natural resources as are timber
or gemstones yet kidnapping for ransom is not so different than exploiting these other
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resources. In both cases people and inanimate (non-animal) natural resources are
typically exploited in illegal markets, during civil conflicts, both must be processed or
stored somehow, and then sold in a market or ransomed in the case of people. The
greed hypothesis is the dominant approach in conceptualizing civil conflict outbreaks,
continuation, and lethality. Brenner (2016) criticizes this theory and others that treat
rebel groups as unitary actors as ideas with little empirical evidence to support. As far
back as the 1970s Scott similarly criticized multifaceted social movements as being
simply labeled “communist” or “nationalist”.
Ross’ (2004) work examines how civil wars begin, their duration, and intensity by
testing 13 hypotheses to identify the causal mechanisms that link these topics to natural
resources. He found eight cases of the 13 tested that were statistically significant and
positive. Most notably they were: 1) resource wealth in an area is more likely to lead to
the outbreak of civil war, a finding that Collier and Hoeffler (2002) also agree. 2) Many
commodities e.g., oil, minerals, and non-food cash crops, are casually linked to
occurrences of civil war, which is similar to the results of Fearon and Laitin (2002), and
de Soysa (2003) that oil-exporting states are more likely to experience civil war. 3) Drug
trafficking did not lead to civil war in Ross’ data, but that it did lengthen the duration of
civil war. 5) The prevalence of ‘lootable’ natural resources does not always correlate to
higher levels of conflict e.g., AGs may cooperate to mine diamonds. 6) Resource wealth
and civil wars are linked by a variety of mechanisms that at the time of his paper’s
publishing were not well understood. Large N quantitative studies can only take
researchers so far in identifying such mechanism and more case studies are required to
uncover those linkages.
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Fearon (2004) seeks to uncover why some civil wars last longer than others.
More specifically his research asks what conditions contribute to a swift victory for one
side or a stalemate? What Fearon discovered is that coups and popular movements like
that of Iran in 1979 conclude quickly. Anti-colonial wars since 1945 and tend to not last
long. Conversely, civil conflicts between a smaller ethnicity that is back by another state
against a dominant ethnicity last longer. As well, civil wars last longer when rebel
groups are able to sell traffic narcotics or profit from extortion.
LeBillon 2001 seeks to discover the theoretical relationships among natural
resources, armed conflicts, and the historical processes by which they are embedded.
He does this by analyzing the materiality, geography, and other socio-economic
processes of armed conflicts and how it relates to natural resources. The author finds
that natural resources and conflicts are related in a couple different manners: 1)
conflicts are motivated by control of resources and 2) those resources are used to
finance conflicts yet case 2 is more common. Exploitation of natural resources does
influence the agendas and structures of AGs but this is not as significant as the
underlying political grievances that motivate civil conflict. Concerning vulnerability of
society to violence, the greater level of ‘lootability’ of a resource and the economic
dependence on that resource then the greater likelihood a society is to succumb to civil
conflict. Naturally, not all states commonly considered to have a high level of reliance on
primary have histories of civil strife but geography and political economy lend
themselves to exacerbating conflicts.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also investigate the causes of civil war using a
dataset of the years 1960-1999. They offer two competing hypotheses regarding the
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onset of internal wars familiar to this subset of literature. Rebellions may arise from
unusually strong grievances like inequality, few political rights, or ethnic, religious, and
societal divisions. However, rebellion may come from atypical opportunities for
belligerents to make financial gain. To test their hypotheses, the authors developed an
econometric model to identify instances of civil war. This article updates Collier and
Hoeffler (1998) which concluded that rebels must make-up losses incurred during
conflict after hostilities end in order to justify initiating a conflict. What they discovered
since that work is that rebels quickly cover their military costs and then some during a
civil war. In light of this realization the authors developed a model that prioritized
opportunities for violence better predicts conflict than one that prioritized political
grievances. An important factor for influencing opportunity for rebellion is the availability
to finance spending on rebel’s materiel and labor costs especially via the sale of primary
commodities. Such incentives for profit make the decision to rebel easier. Similarly,
young men, and women in some cases, have few opportunity costs to forgo joining a
rebel AG when there are few educational institutions in their area or means to earn
good wages. Finally, there is greater probability for rebellion in sparsely populated
geographic areas. The authors three primary findings are consistent with the economics
literature on causes for civil war.

2.6 Kidnapping as a Tactic of Armed Groups
There does not exist a great deal of research dedicated to studying kidnappings;
however, this is changing within the past fifteen years. Case studies documented this
tactic with reference to specific groups such as the FARC or particular cases like that of
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Aldo Moro and the Red Brigades. Pires, Guerette, and Shariati conducted a study using
multiple sociopolitical independent variables, which empirically challenge common
claims that kidnappings occur in failed and weak states. It claims to be the first study of
its kind and the results affirm predictable outcomes that the highest rates of KfR occur in
states with challenged “socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and security” circumstances.85
There is neither great amount of theoretical writing on the related topics of hostage
taking or hijackings of planes, buses, or boats – all tactics that involve preventing the
movement of humans unless in return for financial or political compensation. However,
of note is Tzanelli’s article that critiques the two debates of KfR as a purely political or
financial motive and she puts forth the notion that kidnapping is a natural effect of
capitalism. This work separates itself from other studies on the topic due to its
theoretical approach. Most of the work conducted in this topic comes from
In fact, the terrorist tactic that has received the most significant volume of special
attention in the wider terrorism literature in the past two decades is suicide attacks. This
could be due to the prominence of armed groups in that time, al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
Islamic State or it could be due to the unique nature of someone giving their life for a
cause. In Martin’s words, suicide attacks have an indelible appeal because they:
possess an intelligence and flexibility other weapons do not have; inflict significant
psychological damage on an enemy; are relatively “cheap” weapons, so long as the
reservoir or volunteers is maintained; and exact a high human toll from an enemy while
at the same time incurring acceptable losses.86
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Nevertheless, it is somewhat unusual that not more tactics have received so much
attention as suicide terrorism considering, for example, the innovation of cyber
terrorism. It has the potential to create tremendous harm when used to attack vital
infrastructure like power plants, water filtration plants, or hospitals and banks. Finally,
though, to put the incidence of KfR into perspective below is the following pie chart
depicting “Hostage Taking” as a small proportion of all terrorist attacks for one year.87
Within the hostage taking category is the even smaller subset of kidnap for ransom.

The existing literature on kidnapping runs in two primary tracks of works
exploring the fundamental questions of who, what, when, where, and why. Who is being
kidnapped? What groups are kidnapping? When (which year) are kidnappings
occurring? Why are kidnappings happening (for either financial or political reasons)?

87. Ibid, 291.
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While the other primary, and newer, strain of work on KfR explores the efficacy and
ethics of paying ransoms to kidnappers for the purpose of safely freeing hostages. Both
sets of work emphasize quantitative methods of small N and large N samples and data
sets that span decades. Studies dedicated to various questions on ransom payments
also often use historical illustrations and case studies to enhance their argument.
With respect to establishing basic facts about KfR, Forrest’s study stands out
from the others in regards to how well it describes the groups involved in kidnapping,
the countries where it occurs the most, the nationalities of hostages using 40 years of
data with the conclusion that kidnapping has increased over that period.88 Yu also
presents an interesting analysis from which he develops five typologies of kidnapping
hotspots that he uses to determine different motivations of kidnappers and to determine
how best to resolve those abductions.89 Type 1 are hotspots where KfR is a by-product
of recent war. Type 2 is where kidnapping is chronic and even morphed into a business.
Type 3 hotspots occur where there is internal social strife and conflict typically between
two ethnic or religious groups. Type 4 is the country of Nepal where “terrorists” mostly
use kidnapping to make political propaganda messages and where there is also a low
casualty rate of hostages. Type 5 is Nigeria where foreign employees of MNCs,
especially oil companies, are targets of local kidnappers. Ransom payments from these
cases are commonly used to then invest in small infrastructure projects in local
communities. In this manner Type 5 is unique. Then, Briggs work based on her study of
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geographic KfR hotspots develops the idea as kidnappers as business owners that take
into account risk versus reward which is to a great deal determined by the environment
in they operate. That is, for example, states with weaker governments face lower risk in
their kidnapping business, which is of course more advantageous to kidnappers. Her
work then goes on the describe current (in the year 2000) policies designed to combat
KfR; in this way Briggs work is a bridge to the other main body of kidnapping literature.
Easily the most significant contribution to the discussion on making ransom
payments is journalist Joel Simon’s book published in 2019 We Want to Negotiate: The
Secret World of Kidnapping, Hostages, and Ransom because he addresses both sides
of the argument for and against paying ransoms using nearly 50 years of data and
reviews the current academic and policy evidence to support his claim that to not pay
ransoms is counterproductive.90 Also, of note is Jenkins 2017 Rand publication “Does
the U.S. No-Concessions Policy Deter Kidnapping of Americans?” because he traces
the evolution of the American no-concessions policy since the Nixon administration
highlighting its inconsistencies and raising hypotheses about why such a policy fails to
meet policy makers’ desired goals in his opinion.91 What is also noticeable is that
Jenkins references Rand’s previous work in the 1970s on the subject of public policy
towards the American ransom policy and how those past findings still ring true.
Similar to Jenkins paper is one authored by Loertscher and Milton of the United
States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center Held Hostage: Analyses of
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Kidnapping Across Time and Among Jihadist Organization.92 These authors examine
kidnappings by Jihadist groups since the year 2000 and conclude that kidnappers act
opportunistically with respect to whom they take yet an abductee’s nationality does play
a role in how likely they are to be released. So, Loertscher and Milton decided that
public policy is a factor in whether a hostage is released but they do not cite which
policies effect such outcomes. The outlier study written by Brandt, George, and Sandler,
which uses a fancy Bayesian Poison change-point model, in their in quantitative
analysis of three cohorts of states that differ in their willingness to negotiate with
kidnappers comes to nearly opposite results of the above authors.93 Brandt, George,
and Sandler argued that as “terrorists” were more successful in getting concessions,
either financial or political, they are more likely to continue to kidnap in the future. In
light of these findings they suggest states adopt a no-concessions policy so as not to
motivate more kidnappings of their nationals.
Current literature on kidnapping does well at identifying the geographic areas in
which the phenomenon happens most frequently and those authors who develop these
descriptions do estimate the numbers of hostages across area and time, such as this is
possible to acquire accurate statistics. The literature as it stands also identifies the most
prominent groups that kidnap including vital information such as their origins,
development, ideology, and goals. Vital to presenting this data are the cataloguing work
of the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland and the Center for
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Analytics at the University of New Haven. In the area of policy discourse around paying
kidnappers’ ransoms, the conversation has shown promise and there are opportunities
for more research around this topic. Many opportunities also exist for those who wish to
engage in ethical debates on whether it is permissible to make ransom payments to
kidnappers. What is lacking from discussions around kidnapping, and what this work
seeks to fill in the gaps of, is how are armed group, insurgents, and other similar types
of organizations effected by their choice of kidnapping? This author’s inquiry into how
organizational structures of terror groups change based on their choice of tactics is an
attempt to push the boundaries of the current understanding of kidnap for ransom.

2.7 Conclusion
Groups give protection, meaning, and value to our lives. Without them
societies, cities, and nations would not be possible, and human life could not escape its
primitive beginnings. They develop socializing features that promote the cohesion of its
members and the accomplishment of goals. Norms are a socializing feature that related
to a behavior that may be shared across a wide variety of identifies. Formalization is a
measurement of how well things such as communication, rules, and duties are made
explicit. Social Identity Theory is a method to scientifically analyze groups based on
their behavior towards in-group and out-group members.
Hierarchy is one measure of organizational structure that is indicated by the
degree to which those with ideological or political influence also have operational
influence. Two important dimensions of understanding leadership are the degrees of
charisma and authoritarianism leaders exhibit. Cells or a cellular structure are the
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building blocks of many contemporary terrorist organizations that exist to operationalize
a unique task. Members of cells may form close personal bonds due to the tense and
dangerous environments in which they work and commonly recruit from pre-existing
relationships of family and friends. A terrorist group must pay close attention to the
context in which they operate in addition to its organizational behavior. Competent
leaders and middle managers are needed, as kidnapping requires detailed planning and
organization to be sustained of a long period of time. Leaders must identify and mitigate
risks to their enterprise, including such variables as: detection from CT authorities, the
skillset and resources of their group, and a comprehensive understanding of the
economic, political and social climate. Beyond the political, social, and economic forces
present in an area, environmental, physical geography, and climate can play an
important role in the planning of an attack or wider strategy.
If KfR is to become a viable ‘enterprise’ for armed groups, it will likely need to be
profitable from the outset. When records are available, financial data on terrorist
organizations can illuminate an otherwise shadowy topic. Its study is important because
money is the lifeblood that nourishes every member of the body a terrorist group. A
hallmark of terrorist cells is that in modern times they must provide their own funding
due to a general lowering of state sponsorship since the end of the Cold War. Since that
time, alternative funding sources including KfR, the narcotics trade, and smuggling of
people and goods have become popular sources of revenue. A unique support feature
to Islamic fundamentalist groups is the practice of funneling revenue through charities
from zakat. Another such feature is the use of hawalas that allow currency to be
discretely sent around the world outside of the Western banking system that is
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monitored by governments. With the diversity of black-market funding sources and the
ability to receive legitimate and ill-gotten money surreptitiously, it is difficult for CT
authorities to follow the financing of terrorism.
To armed groups, KfR has a political value, which it does not to criminals. One
attraction to this act is that it can simultaneously raise funds for other operations and
increase fear in a populace that in turn de-legitimizes the government of the state. A
second primary benefit to the kidnappers is that they can promote their cause through
the publicity of a series of kidnappings or the abduction of a high-profile individual. The
goal for insurgents is to convert their prisoner into political concessions from their
hostage’s home country. Trust between negotiators and kidnappers is thin, but some
trust must exist between the parties for an exchange to take place in order for hostages
to return home. During this thrust and parry of negotiations, kidnappers have the upper
hand because they hold a human life. Tzanelli identifies three ascending steps of
increasing violence are the negotiating tactics of silence and threats towards the
opposition negotiating team, abuse of the kidnaped victim, and murder of the kidnapped
victim. Areas of the globe where KfR is most prolific are South Asia and northern Latin
America.
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Chapter Three
The Targets and the Tactics of Armed Groups

3.1 Introduction
Kidnap for ransom is a ubiquitous phenomenon spread unevenly over our globe.
It is a crime of opportunity and sometimes high volume whose culprits do not expect to
be caught. There are somewhere between 25,000 and 100,000 reported kidnappings a
year despite most of the incidents of KfR being unreported to government authorities.94
In January 2014, the United Nations Security Council passed a unanimous resolution
expressing concern about the increase in terrorist kidnapping for ransom due to the fact
that current payments incentivize future kidnappings.95 This form of terrorism occurs in
every part of the world, yet certain states have a notorious reputation for high incidence
of KfR where the phenomenon is concentrated. Some authors suggest, through case
studies and anecdotal evidence, that kidnapping epidemics are most likely to happen in
corrupt, fragile states where violence is widespread.96 The phrases fragile state and
failed states are often synonyms; however, this is a nebulous term with conceptual
shortcomings that attempt to describe a wide variety of states with diverse challenges.
Since the height in popularity of this view in the 1990s through 2000s institutions
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including the UN, World Bank, and agencies within the American government have
dropped use of the term in favor of other more descriptive ones.97 Kidnap for ransom is
not an epidemic in all the places described above, so a more accurate understanding of
and under what conditions it takes place is necessary.
Ideology, target selection, and tactics filter the set of all actions a group could
take to achieve its aims into a narrower set of likely options that group pursues. These
decisions can lead down a path to kidnap for ransom as one of several tactics for
achieving political goals. For this reason, in order to explore consequences of KfR, it is
helpful to uncover how a terrorist organization comes to use this method of attack. In
order to fulfill this objective, the plan of this chapter is to begin this chapter at a wide
focus on the lens of ideology, proceed to a smaller focus of target selection, and then to
the smallest lens of specific tactics commonly used by armed groups. What this will
accomplish is to bring the reader from the literature review to explore the reason why a
group may chose to kidnap to Chapter Four that will dive deep into two cases studies of
dissimilar groups that practice KfR.

3.2 The Role of Ideology in Target Selection
Ideology is the values, principles, beliefs, and objectives by which a group
expresses its distinct political identity; thus, it is the bedrock on which actions are
justified.98 Not all members of an organization will likely hold to a strict ideology. At the
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lowest levels of the group because there will not always be enough true believers to
effectively fill every position in particularly large organizations. Some people are drawn
to the opportunity to enrich themselves, gain status, or acquire protection from a
dominant organization in their area counter to the government. This explains the
difference between the professed political ideology of a group and the actual political
ideology of its members.99 We can see this pattern in many armed groups. Ideology
sets bounds for target selection and use of tactics; however, different political ideologies
arrange those boundaries varyingly from others. Cultural and historic traditions can
make ideological imperatives less straightforward. Maoism rests upon China’s distinct
historical trajectory apart from Europe that leaves it linked to but separate from older
European variants of Marxism. Prominent political ideologies include: ethnonationalist/separatist, religious, left-wing, and right-wing beliefs, yet not all categories
are mutually exclusive.
Ideology is extremely important to a group’s worldview. It is the lens by which
members view their surroundings, interpret current events and history, and what and
how they classify as enemies — even those who do not give a thought to the terrorist’s
mission. For instance, in 1977 the PIRA carried out a short-term assassination
campaign against businessmen on the grounds that their companies helped support the
British ‘occupation’ of Northern Ireland.100 Doubtless, those who were murdered did not
likely have any sense their daily work related to Britain’s governance of the country.
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Once a political group decides to use violence, it must determine who and what
to attack.101 Their ideology determines who their ‘enemies’ are typically based on
concepts of ‘goodness’, ‘badness’, ‘innocence’, and ‘guilt’. Terrorist organizations
generally understand the world in a Manichean manner with themselves as proper
arbiters of right and wrong. These sometimes-complex determinations result in what are
called ‘legitimate targets’, which can be extremely controversial if that mark is also a
‘soft targets’ that are not regularly defended. Soft targets are installations such as
schools, hospitals, cinemas or shopping centers that are public areas where many
people congregate with few security forces on guard. To many people these moral
judgments are radical and troubling and that view is not lost on those who believe them.
Another PIRA member explained to Tony Parker, “I don’t expect to be judged by your
rules: if Brits do that, then they’ll see the IRA as a bunch of ruthless maniacs which by
their definition I suppose we are…The IRA has its own logic and oh no it’s not yours.”102
A specific example of the difference between terrorist ‘exceptional’ behavior and
the mainline judgments of society is the April 1991 assassination of Detlev Rhowedder
by the German Rote Armee Faktion / Red Army Faction (RAF) also known as the
Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe. Here, ‘exceptional’ means a law or social norm that a political
ideology claims it is not bound by because those laws are illegitimate or because the
radicals are only accountable to a higher law. Rohwedder was the head of the German
federal agency responsible for privatizing firms owned by the former DDR, a former
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State Secretary in the FDR Economics Ministry, and earlier a manager at Hoechst
Chemical.103 In a communiqué according to the RAF, Rohwedder was killed for, in their
words, his decades of work as an “armchair murderer” who in the “interest of power and
profits plans the misery and death of millions of human beings”.104 Additionally, by killing
Rohwedder the RAF was protesting the annexation of East Germany and making, again
in their words, a moral act. The Rohwedder murder indicates how terrorist acts are used
to label victims guilty and deserving of judgement outside any established court of
law.105 Crucially this condemnation of the perceived enemy is essential to the mindset of
the radicals who use violence. It absolves them of wrong doing in their own eyes, to
their supporters, and hopefully in the opinion of uncommitted observers whose support
will be necessary to a successful campaign.106 Not many people can bear the belief that
their actions, especially violent actions, are wrong or harmful to others. This is why the
belief that an enemy is guilty is so important for the continuation of a terror strategy.
Another important consequence of ideology is the transformation of people and
objects into representative symbols for the terrorist.107 In the words of one loyalist
interviewed from Northern Ireland who bombed a public house in 1974, “We
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dehumanized the other side and branded them animals. We didn’t think of them in
terms of them being people. If we couldn’t get to the IRA, we would have to slaughter
members of the Catholic community who after all seemed to support them.” 108 No doubt
it becomes easier to murder when one dehumanizes the enemy. Using pejorative
names at the enemy is common practice of viewing people as representative symbols of
the enemy. In Northern Ireland loyalists sometimes disparagingly call Catholics “taigs”
and republicans refer to local soldiers as ‘Brits’.
Of course, the act of assigning guilt to the enemy and symbolizing individuals as
representatives of that enemy is not exclusive to terrorism, for is it also common in
warfare. Glenn Gray says, “The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of
the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of
murder by making of the former an act deserving all honor and praise.”109 American
soldiers and Italian soldiers fought and killed each other during the Second World War,
yet they had little personal animosity towards one another as individuals. Churchill
justified British aerial bombing on German cities for revenge for the Blitz on London and
justly due for the “malignancy” of the German people.110 Michael Walzer famously cited
the bombing of German cities later in the war as a violation of Just War Theory since
there was no longer a “supreme emergency” of a power hostile to the existence of the
British state. That is, by late 1944 it was clear the Germans would lose the war;
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therefore, the continued attack on civilians was unethical.111 With the right ideology
liberal republics are just as able to dehumanize their enemies as terrorist organizations.
One does not need to have done anything to be designated a suitable target
by a terrorist. Merely being oneself can be enough to receive harm from the perspective
of some.112 Crenshaw remarks how during the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) the FLN
regarded bombings against European civilians as legitimate because they represent
French colonial occupation in that country. In France the strategy of attacking European
civilians had the consequence of dividing public opinion on the war then eventually
turning public opinion against continued military action in North Africa. In another case,
a bomb exploded where the Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Association and the
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association were lodging in July 1994. When a Lebanese
authority on Hezbollah was asked why this attack did not take place in Israel, he replied
how it makes no difference where an attack occurs, only that it is against Jews.113
Regardless of one’s race, nationality, or religion it is possible to be targeted despite
seemingly no blameworthy action.
A final ability of ideology on terrorism closely connected to, but different from
attributes listed above, is what could be called ‘guilt deflection’ and victim blaming for
the occurrence of violent attacks.114 This means the guilt most people would ascribe to
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perpetrators of violence is ‘deflected’ by radicals to the physical target (person, persons,
or building) or psychological target as an “inevitable” and unavoidable action.115 For
example, Abu Iyad attributed the 1972 kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes by
Black September at the Munich Olympics to the international community’s failure to
recognize the plight of Palestinians. Furthermore, he claimed the deaths of nine of the
hostages during the standoff with police at Furstenfeldbruck Airport was due to their
attempt to rescue the captives and failure to meet the demands of the Palestinian
separatists. Here, the hostage-takers used a simplistic cause-and-effect perspective
that places blame on parties directly and indirectly involved in their confrontation with
police while taking no responsibility for their own actions.
However, ideology is not all what it seems, and armed groups certainly do take
into account practical concerns, but they can also make mistakes with respect to tactical
choice and target selection. Target selection may be straightforward when an enemy is
walking down the street. Bishop and Mallie assert PIRA initiating the killing of British
soldiers in 1987 was far from an innovation in tactics. It simply acknowledged much
earlier republican ideology and common practice against a traditional enemy.116 In
November 1987 a PIRA spokesmen declared no local unit needed permission to attack
British soldiers; although, it could be said this action was tacit permission granted for
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future attacks.117 On the other hand, sometimes an ideological justification is produced
after an attack is complete. Moss reminds us that most communiqués from the Brigate
Rosse / Red Brigades (BR) claiming responsibility for attacks was released after press
coverage had begun. This was likely done for the sake of tailoring their message to best
capture the wave of media coverage that maximized the BR’s intended communicative
goal.118 Indeed, Wilson claims that after shooting and wounding the incorrect target, a
communiqué was rewritten to claim the wrong person was indeed the intended target.119
The influence of ideology on armed groups can be seen by which targets groups
choose to focus their efforts; this is most easily recognized by comparing data sets on
attacks.120 Northern Ireland offers a unique case to explore the differences between
republican separatists and loyalist forces operating in the same geographic area and at
the same time. Naturally, separatists tend to attack those whom they view as supporting
or assisting the British “occupation” of Ireland in that country, on Great Britain, and at
one point on the Continent.121 Loyalists use violence to protect the existing state of
affairs while also use violence against forces subversive to state interests.122 In this
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sense loyalist radicals were ‘conservative’ insomuch as while they used radical means
they did so to protect the established political order. What severely complicated the
mission of loyalist radicals was their inability to accurately recognize republican forces
and their supporters. A result of this was the frequent indiscriminate targeting of
ordinary Catholics in the belief that they were active supporters of republicanism, or
they were at least culpable for not pressuring the Provisionals to end hostilities. 123
Survey data suggests many ordinary Protestants were also suspicious about casual
support of the PIRA from their Catholics neighbors’.124 This was one issue the PIRA did
not face because British security forces were easy to identify.
Table 1 is a visual representation of the differences between left-wing and rightwing terrorism acts based on who they attacked from republican and loyalist forces.
What it indicates is a large number of attacks against security forces, as has been
mentioned before, a great number of bystanders killed, and although attacks against
buildings are not specifically recorded it is included in the large number of “Others”. A
majority of attacks from loyalists were directed at civilian Catholics plus a small number
of political activists and republican radicals. By and large violent sectarian attacks
shown in this table come from loyalists with outliers directed against sectarian allies.
Conversely, violent attacks from republican forces are more numerous across all
categories.
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Interestingly, there can also be targeting differences in groups with similar
ideologies as seen in Table 2 below which catalogues attacks by the BR and RAF.
While both groups shared Marxist-Leninist beliefs, they did have distinct differences in
their particular goals that are evident in whom they attacked. Likely due to their heritage
as a splinter group of the Communist Party, the BR placed a much greater priority on
the overthrow of the Italian state.125 Conversely, the German RAF with its more
anarchist worldview put greater emphasis on upending the international capitalist global
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order.126 As the table below indicates the RAF selected high profile targets of business
executives, government officials, and U.S. military personnel; however, they eschewed
attacking low-level bureaucrats and ordinary police officers. This reflected the RAF’s
internationalist goals as opposed to national aims of overthrowing the West German
government.127 On the contrary, Italian leftist radicals originated in the factories of
northern Italy and their rage was primarily directed against factory managers, junior
representatives of the state, and police; a practice in line with their national oriented
goals.128
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Ideology is not the only explanation for differences between who the BR and RAF
attacked and how many attacks took place. For instance, the BR had many more
members than the RAF so it could take a far greater number of actions against its
adversaries. With fewer resources one might expect the RAF to attack less high-profile
targets that would presumably not be well protected; however, due to their ideological
bent they chose not to pursue more practical objectives.129 While ideology is far from
the only consideration of a terrorist organization, in terms of planning, it is nevertheless
significant for how a group judges the nature of people and institutions while also setting
parameters on how it conducts its own actions.

3.3 The Role of Strategy on Target Selection
Terrorism is one of several strategies, both violent and non-violent, a group may
use to achieve its political goals. While conditional to its resources, an organization may
pursue a variety of strategies including: peaceful protests, putting forward candidates for
elected office, conventional warfare, or revolutions. Here, strategy is the plan any
person or group uses to organize and then deploy its resources to achieve political
objectives.130 The strategic objectives of terrorism are not the same as political
objectives, but the long-term results against an enemy to inflict physical and
psychological violence on a target audience.131 Success in a terrorist campaign requires
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the correct amount of “pressure and encouragement” directed against a target
population in order to secure a desired outcome.132 It is normal for an organization to
change strategies to counter the adaptations of security forces or the evolving political
climate to achieve its goals. Upon the announcement of a ceasefire in August 1994, a
Sinn Fein representative claimed, “One thing we all know is that the struggle is not over.
We are into a new and important phase in the struggle.”133 This ceasefire would last
until 1996, but in the meantime the struggle for a united Ireland would continue by other
means.
In reality it can be difficult to predict the reaction a terrorist attack will have in the
short term or the long term. Groups do not want to alienate their supporters or accept a
reprisal from CT authorities that would prove devastating to their survival. For these
reasons selecting a target and tactic should be made carefully to strike the right balance
of daringness and carefulness to maximize strategic advantage. Good use of media can
amplify the achievement of a successful assault or lower the publicity of a botched
mission.
The strategic planning of an act of terrorism can be thought to exist along a
horizontal axis, with one end representing ‘spectacle’ purposes and the opposite end
representing ‘practical’ ones, with specific acts being positioned somewhere in-between
this “symbolic/practical” continuum. Near the “symbolic” pole lie terrorist acts of the
Anarchist movement in the 19th through early 20th centuries and the saran gas attack on
the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo. Such displays were undoubtedly logical to the
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attackers but also highly spectacular134 Closer to the “practical” end of this continuum is
the 1983 Beirut bombing on the American and French barracks. The Americans and
French were members of an international peacekeeping mission, but they were seen by
the local Shia population as actually siding with the Israelis and Christian militias during
Lebanon’s civil war. This was a dramatic attack by Islamic Jihad, but the planners also
had a specific goal in mind—to push out the foreigners. So, some armed groups pursue
strategic objectives in a detailed, careful manner, and others pursue their strategic goals
through a garish spectacle with no immediate particular aim besides creating fear.
An example of crafting the strategic process can be seen in the Peruvian group
Sendero Luminoso Shining Path (SL) that developed principles derived from Maoist
ideology in its fight against the Peruvian government. The fundamental principle of Mao
Tse-tung’s military philosophy is guerrilla warfare: this is warfare practiced against a
superior force composed of light forces using hit-and-run tactics in a war of attrition until
the guerrilla force can overtake the formerly superior force in open battle. This is
different than terrorism in that terrorism is, much more than guerilla warfare, designed to
engage in a psychological struggle against an enemy that generally causes physical
damage, and cannot defeat a traditional military force by that method alone. However,
terrorism can be used by groups that practice guerrilla warfare.
Mao developed this viewpoint in the 1930s due to China’s overwhelmingly rural
population of peasants; this majority rural demographic persisted until as recently as
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2011.135 136 His belief in the peasantry as a revolutionary force is in direct contrast to
older Marxist-Leninist ideology which held urban laborers were the only revolutionary
class.137 In this regard the role of the Chinese Communist Party would be to mobilize
peasants in the initial pockets the communists controlled. Such mobilization consisted of
recruiting new members and material in an area safe from attack by the Nationalist and
later Japanese enemy forces.138 Given the disparity between Mao’s small communist
movement versus his larger enemy, his strategy was to play defense while harassing
the advancing opponent. As an enemy marched deeper into communist territory and
extended its lines of supply the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and guerillas would
attack at that point when the enemy’s military is most vulnerable in the field.139
Concurrently, communist forces advanced into new villages to spread their political
message, acquire more resources, and enroll fresh recruits for their struggle. In the final
stage of the war the spirited PLA riding high on a string of small victories pressed the
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enemy in the cities where they were based to conclude the war by victories in open
battle.140
Despite the numerous revolutionaries Mao inspired, he believed his strategy that
defeated the Japanese and Kuomintang was less important than a country’s geography,
social history, economics, and relative strength of adversary.141 He thought few
principles from other conflicts could be generally applied to military science. One such
disciple of the Maoist tradition was the SL of Peru.
For the approximately 25 years SL was active it followed a rural revolutionary
strategy based on Mao’s example; in fact, the founder of SL, Abimeal Guzmán, has
gone so far as proclaiming himself the intellectual heir of Mao.142 Consciously aware of
their own environment, SL has grafted beliefs and grievances of the Andean Quechua
Indians to conventional Maoist ideology to appeal to those indigenous people so they
can maintain a base of support in Ayacucho Province.143 144 In addition to this
departure, they have not avoided terrorist acts in Lima. For the first ten years of group’s
existence, Guzman focused on building support for their movement with the rural

140.

Ibid, 181.

141.

Ibid, 189.

Simon Strong, Shining Path: The World’s Deadliest Revolutionary Force
(London, UK: HarperCollins, 1992), 71.
142.

143.

The Quechua are commonly and incorrectly known as the Incans; however,
Inca refers to the aristocracy in that society and not the (word I can’t remember!!!)
Simon Strong, Shining Path: The World’s Deadliest Revolutionary Force
(London, UK: HarperCollins, 1992), 84.
144.

68
population in remote Ayacucho.145 Beginning in 1980 SL commenced what Smith calls
“a thousand little wars across the Andes”.146 Every one of these “thousand wars”
consisted of displacing institutions of traditional life not only including attacking
government officials but also priests, teachers, businessmen, and judges, i.e. pillars of
status quo society.147
To subdue the countryside, upon entering a community SL identifies the most
unpopular person and the most respected person. Once this is determined they kill the
former and persuade the later, through intimidation or exile if necessary, to cooperate or
to at least not interfere with the new order of things.148 On occasions, for instance when
a religious community, village, or development project interfered with the plans of the SL
or vied for the loyalty of local residents, the group has executed full-scale massacres to
enforce single-minded loyalty to their cause.149 Amazingly, in 1989 over three-quarters
of deaths caused by the SL were among rural Peruvians and the urban poor — the
natural constituency the group needs to appeal to for its long-term success.150 Such
attacks are in addition to guerilla violence against police, military, and government
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officials who must be forced from areas SL wants to occupy before its assault on
Lima.151
Since the growth in Lima’s population by country dwellers emigrating to the city,
SL has begun to perform urban operations. To this end it has also attempted to
organize urban cells and developed social programs for new residents of the city
simultaneously attacking different programs sponsored by other organizations.152 Part of
this urban strategy in Lima involved exploding car bombs in the city to undermine
confidence in the police to keep public order.153
Generally, Shining Path has adhered to the established Maoist military
strategy by establishing areas of control in rural regions with an aim at isolating the
cities until they are most vulnerable for capture. SL adopted this strategy to fit the
particular conditions of Peru co-opting indigenous peoples’ grievances and bringing the
fight to Lima. In September 1994 the Peruvian government captured Guzmán initiating a
slow decline of SL that reached a nadir from 2010 to 2012 when many remaining
leaders were killed or captured.
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One practical problem with terrorist operations is how well a target is protected.
Some targets such as ordinary civilians and shopping malls have no defenses at all. On
the other hand, other targets like banks and senior politicians are nowadays afforded
enough security to make an attack costly for the terrorist or at minimum able to
withstand a violent incident.
A dictum regarding terrorism is that no target can be perfectly protected so
opportunities for political violence will always exist. This is at its core an economic
problem of limited resources available for target protection. During the worst period of
terrorism in Italy from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, the security services reportedly
provided 3.681 bodyguards for 671 individual judges, politicians, and business
executives.154 Similarly, a 1990 audit of London’s Metropolitan Police found that
personal protection costs accounted for over five percent of the department’s total
spending.155 The best protection cannot be given to everyone, and if it were it would not
be without gaps that would be exploited.
A second rule that can be applied to target protection is that, the less public
knowledge that is known about a potential target, the better that is for its safety. Armed
groups cannot attack someone if they do not know where or when a target will be at a
specific location. Naturally, this is a problem for public figures such as high-ranking
politicians, religious leaders, and noted activists who are widely covered by the media or
use social media themselves. Wurth notes that business executives who believe
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themselves targets should remove their telephone numbers and home addresses from
public records; although, it may be impossible to not keep an online presence. Indeed,
in 1987 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was touring British inner cities, but for her
safety specific times and locations of her appointments were kept out of the papers.156
Individuals working in embassies are sometimes located in dangerous host countries
and are desirable targets due to their nature as representatives of foreign states, yet for
effectiveness in their job embassy employees must be open to interact with the public.
A distinction can be made between static targets, that remain in place for a long
period of time, and mobile ones which frequently move between destinations.157 The
most obvious example of a static target is a building – although preferably one highly
trafficked or with symbolism. A person may also be a static target when they are giving
a speech or in a meeting; moreover, examples of this sort include several attempts
made on Adolf Hitler’s life most notable of which was the July Plot at Hitler’s Wolf
Lair.158 Mobile targets are most commonly modes of transportation including airplanes,
trains, automobiles, and their occupants while in motion. Urban targets are the third
category of targets such as a town that may have specific targets like factories;
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however, the entire town can still be in danger. For the sake of relevance this study will
only focus on mobile targets because static and urban targets cannot be kidnapped.
Transit is a popular time to attack a mobile target because during this period it is
at a vulnerable position.159 Automobile targets are weak because, if attacked, they are
not easy to hide, their movement is restricted by road traffic, it is difficult to get
assistance to them when under fire, they are easy to ambush, and the movement of
human passengers are within the vehicle.160 If a terrorist group knows where someone
lives and works that gives it valuable information that can be used for an ambush. The
more a group learns about that target’s route the greater the advantage it has for a
successful mission.
When planning an attack, a crucial piece of information about a target is knowing
where and when they will be at an unsecure, vulnerable location.161 Therefore, the aim
of the protective service defending a potential target is to prevent attackers from
acquiring that information if not by keeping a low profile then by not publicizing that
news.162 Another defensive tactic is altering driving routes in addition to departure and
arrival times to disrupt routine schedules so movements are less predictable. During the
Troubles in Northern Ireland, judges were known to change driving routes to their
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offices and even switch vehicles between their homes’ and court buildings.163 However,
as the editor of International Security Review, Tony Slinn observed, “You may change
your route to work each day, but when you drive out of your front gate, you’ve got to
turn either right or left, and the terrorists know that too”.164 For this reason most
kidnappings take place near the target’s residence, according to Clutterbuck.165
Once a target is selected the next step for a terrorist is to penetrate any
protection, human or construction, that target has defending it. The correct approach to
such defensive measures depends on whether the goal of the attack is to kill or capture.
If the target should be killed then any method will work so long as it achieves that
objective and does not violate any other priority, e.g. injuring children. For a capture
operation, a terrorist group will likely need a more sophisticated plan that avoids
seriously injuring the target or the kill or capture of comrades. Mobile human targets
may have a variety of defenses. In the case of an unarmed civilian, an assassination
can be carried out simply enough with a small number of attackers and simple
weapons. In the west the most popular weapon of choice are firearms.166 In 1971 police
and the British Army began wearing body armor while on patrol.167 A PIRA spokesman
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admitted that after this policy was initiated it was then harder to kill protective
personnel.168
An attack planned against a protected mobile target, likely an armored car, will
need a sophisticated plan and some knowledge of how the reinforced target is
designed. Common reinforcements will include: bulletproof glass, run-flat tires,
reinforced paneling, thick armor encasing the fuel tank and engine. Such a vehicle is
temporarily able to deflect bullets with a high probability of escape to safety and to call
for assistance. Although this type of automobile is valuable for its impressive capabilities
it is not without limits. Famously, in December 1973 a car carrying the Spanish Prime
Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco and his driver, were lifted over a five-story church after
a large bomb was detonated beneath a street by ETA.
If the terrorist attack is a kidnapping, a major concern for the attackers of a high
priority target are the presence of bodyguards. Of course not all judges, business
executive, legislators should be expected to have protection, but some will be heavily
protected.169 The role of a bodyguard is to take evasive action when an attack is
immanent; however, if an attack occurs bodyguards must put themselves between
danger and their client.170 Additionally, if the target is in transit, attackers must expect
their target’s automobile to be accompanied by a second vehicle filled with men who are
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firearm trained.171 In these instances a team of gunmen must quickly neutralize the
accompanying vehicle and those in the target’s car without seriously injuring the mark.
When those plotting terrorism are presented with a target protected by strong
defenses, they have three options: to give up completely, strike by other means, or
attack a different target altogether.172 It is difficult to measure how much defensive
measures deter violence because we cannot know about attacks that do not happen.
Studies have suggested the overt presence of security guards is a key factor thieves
account for when planning to rob a bank.173 Although danger may discourage criminals
from illegal activity, it may not dissuade those with political motivations. In fact, a
successful attack on a well-defended target would be a triumphal coup for someone
who could pull off such a bold assault due to the huge amount of media attention that
could be generated. By scoring a victory against one of the enemy’s hard targets violent
groups wish to create a sense of omnipresence in society.
The measures armed groups take to overcome formidable defenses can come in
the form of overwhelming force through superior firepower or completely circumventing
fortifications. An example of bypassing protection by negating the effectiveness of a
fortification is the wooden horse the Greek coalition used to secretly invade the city of
Troy in ancient Greek folklore. One popular method of overcoming protective barriers is
using an automobile as a battering ram. A significant drawback of this tactic is that the
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driver and other passengers in the vehicle will almost certainly die. For this reason, it is
no deterrent for suicide bombers. We can see the disregard for one’s own life in
exchange for the success of a mission by Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide attacks in
the West Bank, Gaza and Israel proper during the mid 1990s. Bombers in those attacks
simply walked or drove alongside the target concerned, and then detonated the bombkilling killer and query.174 Defensive measures are unlikely to deter individuals willing to
forgo their lives for a cause.
Circumventing protective countermeasures requires moving around defenses
rather than using sheer force to penetrate through them. For instance, if attacking an
embassy, one could make a diversionary attack to draw away the instillation’s guards to
more easily enter the facility. This scenario occurred at the American embassy in
Nairobi in 1998 during an al Qaeda attack. If the identity of the target is general rather
than specific, circumventing defenses can take the form of attacking a similar target
where it is less safe.175 The PIRA took this approach as they found it more difficult to kill
British soldiers in Northern Ireland; consequently, they targeted them in England and
the Continent. Between January 1988 and December 1990, they murdered 21 service
members outside of Northern Ireland versus 39 in the country.176
As well as modifying the method of attack, strong protective measures can
encourage attackers to choose a different target entirely. This process has been
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examined by economists using econometrics to explain patterns in international
terrorism.177 They concluded that ‘terrorists’ will, ceteris paribus, nearly always attack
the softest target commensurate with their goals on the basis that overcoming
countermeasures – measured in time, resources, and risk – is lower.178 Their
conclusions rest on the assumption that those who commit acts of terror are rational
actors who maximize utility and minimize cost by responding to market changes.
Economists studied the effects on security after American embassies were fortified
since 1976 and the installation of metal detectors in American and other airports
beginning in the early 1973.179 Those countermeasures led to decreased attacks on the
installations that implemented them, yet did not lead to fewer attacks overall because
armed groups would instead attack other soft targets, e.g. shopping malls or places of
worship. There was no aggregate decrease in violence unless a reduction in resources
available to armed groups also occurred by CT authorities. In economic terms, we might
call this phenomenon a substitution good. As consumers may purchase more chicken
as fish becomes more expensive, gunmen will attack more subway stations as train
stations become more secure. There are signs that as aircraft hijackings decreased
after security improved in airports non-aircraft hostage-taking increased as a
substitute.180
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3.5 Factors Associated with Violent Crime and Kidnap for Ransom
Anecdotal evidence and case studies suggest certain domestic factors including
high amounts of corruption, poor economic conditions, high levels of violence are
associated with higher incidence of KfR. States that are often recently cited as
examples of experiencing kidnapping epidemics are Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq.
Another factor possibly contributing to the bad reputation of above-mentioned states is
lack of reporting to authorities of kidnapping incidents, which makes it impossible for CT
experts to bring perpetrators to justice and save victims.181 Pires, Guerette, and Shariati
tested for these “contextual variables” they claim might enable KfR epidemics in diverse
parts of the globe.182 For instance, in Colombia during the 1990s as much as 99 percent
of kidnappers were never apprehended for their crimes.183 Such low reporting rates
might reflect citizens’ distrust in their government because they believe that officials are
ineffective or corrupt. If police are unwilling to pursue kidnappers and the state’s
prosecution is unable to obtain a conviction, victims of crime are likely unwilling to report
inflicted abuses. For such reasons countries with high levels of corruption are also more
likely to be unable to suppress rampant KfR.
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A majority of studies on the connection between poor economic opportunity and
violent crime indicate a strong relationship does not exist; this is despite the intuition
that few financial prospects may lead individuals to turn towards rash ways to make
easy money.184 To the contrary, most research on this matter actually indicates that
crime increase as economies grow – for reasons too numerous to delve into.185 What
comes to mind is the rise in crime in many states where industrialization began in the
19th century. Tourism, especially tourists from affluent nations, is one such economic
activity that may put states at greater risk to KfR.186 It is true that the majority of kidnap
victims are locals, however Western hostages command a high price for their release
from captivity. Indeed, Islamic fundamentalist armed groups covet Westerners because
these groups make most of their kidnapping revenue from this demographic.
The final hypothesis offered by Pires, Guerette, and Shariati, in addition to the
two mentioned above as drivers of kidnap for ransom, concerns the amount of violent
crime measured in annual murders. It may sound self-evident, but states that suffer
from high levels of one type of violent crime, including murder, are also victim to other
types of violent crime such as KfR.187 Put more simply, regions where murder or rape
are endemic should see a correlation with other acts of violence. A person who is willing

184.

Kristin M. Finklea, “Economic Development and Crime,” Congressional
Research Service Library of Congress, (2011).
185.

François Bourguignon, “Crime, Violence, and Inequitable Development “ in
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1999, (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 2000), 199-220.
186

. See supra note 13, 143.

187.

See supra note 13, 143.

80
to do violence against another person is probably not someone who has ethical qualms
against committing a different violent act. To offer an illustration, when Colombia
suffered widespread homicide in the 1980s through the early 2000s, it simultaneously
experienced prevalent levels of kidnap for ransom.188 The execution of hostages alone
could not fully explain an elevated homicide rate in Colombia because that would mean
kidnappers are killing all valuable captives. High rates of KfR may be emblematic of
police effectiveness or lack of public trust in their police. In the sense that if CT
authorities or police are unable to suppress kidnapping it is likely they will also be
unable quell homicide and terrorism.189
The Pires, Guerette, and Shariati paper is the first to systematic study which
economic, social, political, and security variables contribute to high levels of kidnap for
ransom within a given state. It used a case-control design that compared states with
many cases of KfR (experimental group) to ones with few cases of KfR (control group);
unsurprisingly, they found that nations with elevated levels of kidnap for ransom on
average were less peaceful, less secure, and had uneven economic distribution within
society.190 Specifically, of the fifteen variables they found five significant tested in the
study, three security-related, one social-related, and one economic-related. Security &
Society a variable measuring a variety of interconnected “factors such as perception of
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criminality, violent crime, incarceration, and security officers and police.”191 Security
Apparatus measures “how much authority governments are able to exert over their
countries” like the Weberian dictum about what constitutes a state.192 193 Global
Terrorism Index measures “the number of terrorist incidents, fatalities, injuries, and
property damage” of 162 states that are then ranked by amount of damage done and
includes 99.6 of global population.194 Global Peace Index aggregate “measures national
peacefulness” through a composite index including 162 nations that are ranked.195 It,
along with the Global Terrorism Index were produced by Vision of Humanity, an
enterprise of the Institute of Economics and Peace. Finally, Uneven Economic
Development is a composite index that measures how “governments are inconsistent in
the fulfillment of their social and economic obligations.”196
A map of the states compared in the Pires, Guerette, and Shariati study is shown
below in Figure 1.
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These cases were selected from data acquired by the authors, but created by IKV PAX
Christi, an organization that works in 15 countries to promote peace and justice. We can
see most regions of the globe are represented save Europe and Southeast Asia.
Recently, hotspots of kidnappings where the highest numbers of attacks occur
are confined to a handful of states. Two noteworthy cases where this has recently
occurred are Iraq and Afghanistan since the coalition invasion and occupation due to
the toppling of those former governments. Perhaps the most widely recognized country
with a ubiquitous kidnapping phenomenon is Columbia sometimes known as the
“kidnapping capital of the world.”197 Other hotspots are Russia, Philippines, Nigeria,
India, and Nepal where there are violent separatist movements or religious extremists.
In previous decades left-wing radicals heavily targeted Latin America and Europe.
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It is reassuring to know that earlier presumptions on which factors contribute to
kidnap for ransom have been verified in a systematic method; yet this work is not
enough to fully explain why KfR problems occur in some places but not others. Another
likely difference between areas with KfR problems and those areas without KfR
problems not discussed above is the opportunities and incentives for dark networks to
commit kidnappings. That is, terrorist organization Z may operate in two states (A and
B) with high and low rates of KfR, but Z may find it more advantageous to commit
different crimes based on the effectiveness of local police. For example, money
laundering might be more likely to take place in developed states where financial
markets are more mature and rule of law well established, whereas KfR might be more
likely to take place where financial markets are immature and the rule of law is weak. 198

3.6 Anatomy of a Kidnapping
Although there is no standard method to conduct a kidnap, recent attacks by the
group al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) follow a similar pattern, according to
Dutton.199
First, the terrorist group generally minimizes the risk to group members by
outsourcing the initial hostage-taking to criminal organizations working on a
commission. Once the terrorist group receives the hostages, it then observes a
long period of silence designed to create some panic among the hostage’s loved
ones. Thereafter, negotiations for a ransom begin, often with a video showing the
hostages begging their governments to pay for the hostage’s safe release.
Additional videos usually follow showing the hostages surrounded by armed
guards in an effort to reinforce the group’s message that the hostage will be
198.
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executed if their demands are not met. Ransom negotiations...can drag on for
months or even years. Payments to the terrorist group often happen with the aid
of third-party [sic] intermediaries who negotiate and facilitate the transfer of
ransom payments into a designated bank account or through an alternative
remittance system, such as a hawala.
Hawala, literally meaning remittance, is an informal method to send money that does
not use formal financial institutions such as a bank or credit union.
According to Tzanelli, the modus operandi of kidnap for ransom is “converting
one thing (the victim) into another (money).200 However, so-called terrorist kidnappings
are committed in the name of a greater cause than the simple accumulation of
economic capital, they exist to reach a means to a greater end. That is, they have
value-oriented reason a belief in a system of values for their own sake. An example of
this phenomenon is kidnapping of foreigners by Iraqi insurgences that made money
from capturing foreigners for the higher goal of liberating their country from coalition
forces. It has also been observed that kidnapers consider their victims as a commodity
that should be treated carefully for the purpose of maximizing profit through sale on the
market. For instance, one man (“Alexander”) who was kidnapped with a business
colleague by the FARC in April 2000 remarked of his kidnappers: “The guerillas were
extremely respectful […] They took care of us like an investment. The commander said,
“If you feel sick, if someone lacks respect, I’m here to help. The only thing you [must]
have is patience.”” “Alexander’s” description of his kidnapper’s polite behavior presents
their actions as a rational tactic to protect their ‘goods’ from damage. However, there is
no generic template that makes a standard kidnapping because the variables in each
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case, including: modus operandi of the particular group, geographic location,
effectiveness of local CT authorities and law enforcement, the presence of rule of law,
how the kidnappers wish to be paid, etc. Below is a visual representation of one
possible KfR scenario from the Financial Action Task Force, an independent, intergovernmental body that develops policies and advocates protecting the global financial
system.201

In kidnapping negotiations, trust acts as a contract between the kidnappers and
the negotiating party over which the kidnappers have control.202 Tzanelli divides the
actions of the kidnappers to the kidnapped into the categories of: threats and silence to
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the negotiating opposing negotiating team, application of abuse to the victim, and
murder of the captive.203 Threats and silence are more favorable to the second party
negotiating for the release of the captive than abuse, physical or non-physical, or
murder. Silence is a negotiating tactic that injects a new element of uncertainty to the
dialogue when heretofore an impasse was reached between parties. It was the effect of
reminding the second party of the value of the captured person and of the potential
harm that may be currently inflicted on the captured person. These suspicions by the
second party have the desired effect of leading to resuming negotiations and a quick
delivery of ransom to the kidnappers an overall more favorable outcome for them.
Abuse is an intermediary step between threats/silence and murder that asserts
the power of the captors Murder of captives may seem a senseless act because it
destroys the ‘goods’ naturally ending any possibility of a financial transaction, but it
actually indicates that (1) even outlaws have their own code of conduct and (2) the
kidnappers want to save face by keeping their threats of violence credible.204 In this way
a murder of a captive for which kidnappers do not receive payment serves as a ‘selfcompensation’ because they still retain the ‘integrity’ of their word towards the opposing
negotiating team. Violence as used in an act of terror is a means to an end therefore
strategic.205

203.
204

Ibid, 940.

. Ibid, 940.

205.

Ibid, 940.

87
Sometimes kidnappings end with a hostage’s government, company, or loved
ones paying the requested ransom to the hostage takers. Authorities commonly pay
requested ransom demands despite contrary statements although the details are not
often made public and governments generally deny this policy.206 For instance, there
are conflicting accounts about whether France paid €20 million for four male hostages
captured by AQIM who were working in Niger for the French nuclear energy group,
Areva.207 A relative of a hostage who remained in captivity recounted that she was told
that, while the government would not pay the ‘terrorists’, Areva was free to do so.208
However, others claim the sum was paid by France’s secret service.209 Other states,
such as the UK or US, that have a record of not negotiating with armed groups, often
attempt to rescue their citizens with typically unsuccessful tragic results.210 In 2014 the
United States deployed dozens of Navy SEALs in an effort to rescue American
photojournalist Luke Somers held by AQAP in Yemen. Unfortunately, once the al206.
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Qaeda fighters realized what was occurring they murdered Somers and his fellow
captive, South African Pierre Korkie.211

3.7 Conclusion
Evidence indicates that domestic social issues, such as crime, corruption, and
weak economic conditions are associated with elevated rates of kidnap for ransom.
However, there is an even greater positive relationship between economic growth and
violent crime. Additionally, violent crime of one variety, e.g. armed robbery, is
associated with increased levels of other violent crime as well. Pires, Guerette, and
Shariati concluded economic, political, security, and social variables contribute to a high
level of KfR in states they observed.
Adherence to an ideology can be a powerful driving force for some members of
armed groups; however, others motivated by the chance for financial gain or elevated
stature in a community. Ideology has a way of setting boundaries of acceptable
behavioral for a group. It is the lens by which an organization understands the world
around it as well as history and outsiders. The recognition that their beliefs are radical is
not lost, and even embraced, by true believers of radical ideologies. An important use of
ideology is how it is used by some to label other people and objects into representative
symbols. Guilt deflection is a use of ideology to blame a victim or otherwise excuse
one’s own actions that are normally considered socially unacceptable.
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In the context of terrorism studies, strategy is the method by which a group, or
single actor, intends to achieve stated goals. Any such strategy will use violence and
should be commiserate with the organization’s, or individual’s, ideology. Tactical
planning for an attack may be conceptualized as lying upon a horizontal axis with one
direction representing symbolic and the opposite direction representing practical—in
reality, a terrorist attack with lie somewhere between these two extremes. Some attacks
have a primarily symbolic purpose to shock and surprise while others will have a more
direct purpose to injure and maim a target. An example of a popular strategy was
inspired by the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-tung and adopted by the left-wing
Peruvian group Shining Path in their struggle against that country’s central government.
A major impediment to a successful terrorist campaign is target protection—a
real life game of cat and mouse. Targets may be either mobile, as in a person or train,
or immobile, such as with a place of worship or government facility. During transit is an
optimal time to attack a mobile target because security forces cannot fully restrict others
whom are also on the same or adjacent street as the target under protection. If
insurgents are planning to attack a mobile target it is essential for them to know when
and where their target is located. One important method by which targets are protected
is by limiting the amount of public information about their whereabouts available so that
information is not used to plan an attack. In addition to limiting the amount of information
about a target’s location and movements, when protecting a mobile target, it is also
useful to alternate regular movements and change vehicles in order not to establish
regular patterns. Against a strong defense, plotters have three options: to abort the
mission altogether, develop a new tactic, or select a different target completely. If an
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assault by other means is decided, success may be achieved by employing
overwhelming forces or circumventing defenses. If a decision is made to attack a
different target, the softest or least secure will likely be selected.
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Chapter Four
Case Studies

4.1 Introduction
Kidnap for ransom (KfR) in Colombia and Afghanistan is a common phenomenon
in areas of conflict. Civil servants, soldiers, foreign nationals, and soldiers are regularly
targeted because they are all valuable either in exchange for imprisoned compatriots or
money. In particular, bureaucrats, politicians, and police or military members hold great
symbolic value to their government and thereby to the captors of the kidnapped.
One notorious case in Afghanistan included 23 South Korean missionaries abducted
from their bus in Ghazni Province in 2007. Two men were murdered and the remnant
were released six weeks later reportedly in exchange for US$20 million and the
withdraw of all 200 non-combat Korean troops in Afghanistan by end of year 2007. This
last point illustrates the difficulty in separating KfR from kidnap for political gains.
Despite some well-known KfR cases in Afghanistan and Colombia little academic work
exists on the subject from the perspective of kidnappers. For the FARC and Taliban
income generated by KfR pales in comparison to what either organization made from
their respective drug trades. Furthermore, in the case studies of the Taliban and the
FARC while KfR has been a reliable source of income and when economic motivated
kidnappings do occur in Afghanistan and Colombia the change to the Taliban and the
FARC’s organizational behavior has proved imperceptible to decipher between the two
revenue sources.

92
Thomas Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell were the three Americans
private military contractors held concurrently with Senator Íngrid Betancourt in the
former demilitarized zone in south central Colombia. Their account, Out of Captivity,
jointly authored by the three men with Gary Brozek describes how they and their fellow
captives were kept by the FARC in steel cages or chained to trees. FARC guerrillas
kept the group of captives moving so as to avoid detection from the American and
Colombian CT authorities. In the case of the kidnapped South Koreans, they were
shuffled between farmhouse and cellars oftentimes in small groups of three and four
during their six weeks captivity. What these cases illustrate is that the capture and
imprisonment of both groups was opportunistic and improvised. There were no specific
arrangements made by the FARC or Taliban for keeping captives in their territory.
After introducing relevant but limited historical material on the FARC and the
Taliban, this chapter examines available KfR data and notable cases of the two groups.
Unfortunately, it is clear that neither group adopted a perceptible organizational change
from KfR and that the tactic itself corresponds to a small fraction of both groups’ overall
activity. Therefore it is reasonable to look somewhere else to determine if organizational
development actually did result from similar illicit activities. The Taliban and the FARC
make tremendous money from the opium and cocaine trades respectively. Numerous
amounts of literature document the overall trades and how both groups participate in it
to great benefit. Narco-trafficking is not strictly terrorism by the Hoffman definition used
earlier in this study because (1) narco-trafficking is not inherently political nor (2)
designed to have a far-reaching psychological impact beyond the immediate deed.
Nevertheless, narco-trafficking often results in violence as a by-product of the trade, it
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is, at least in the case of the FARC and Taliban; done by non-state actors; and both
organizations poses an identifiable chain of command, are un-uniformed, and do have
organizational structure. With this in mind, and in order to test this work’s hypothesis, it
is reasonable to study the organizational changes from narco-trafficking on the FARC
and the Taliban. After an examination of both groups’ narco-trafficking activities an
analysis of the kidnapping and drug trafficking behaviors will commence.

4.2 Colombian State Weaknesses in the 20th Century
At the height of the insurgency at the end of 20th century the violence and
instability in Colombia was staggering. Warfare, crime, and internal migration affected
tens of thousands of people whose lives were disrupted. Nearly 40,000 politically
motivated murders were committed between 1990 and 2001 with a staggering 25,660
from all kinds of murders in the year 2000 alone.212 More than 5,400 civilian noncombatants perished in 2001 as a result of the civil war, which represents approximately
a 350 percent increase over 1998.213 Between January 1995 and January 2001 7,748
reported kidnappings took place in Colombia, however; this number likely undercounts
the actual number of kidnappings as most go unreported to authorities.214
In economic terms the litany of crime and warfare resulted in the most severe
economic depression ever to strike the country with unemployment hitting above 20
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percent during 2000-2001.215 an estimated 2,858,000 Colombians were unemployed in
July 2001. In 1999 industrial capacity fell 17 percent. From 1993 to 1999, foreign
investment plummeted 70 percent as firms fled for a lack of security and shrinking local
market.216 In concert with an IMF restructuring and loan package in 2000, the
Colombian government raised taxes, increased privatization, slashed funding on social
welfare programs, while increasing military spending precipitously.217 Two years later in
2002 roughly 40 percent of government revenue went towards repaying foreign loans;
thus, a substantial share of public spending was not directed to social services, which
put an even greater strain on the peoples’ lives. This profound depression came as a
shock to Colombians who thought they had been immune to the debt woes of Latin
America of the 1980s and 1990s during which time the Colombian economy was
thrived. Worsening the long-term economic and social situation was the increasing
wealth inequality in historically one of the most unequal states in the region. For
instance, the Colombian Gini coefficient jumped from 0.55 in 1991 to 0.59 in 1999.218
These were the conditions of the nation during the FARC’s greatest strength.
The origins of the most successive militant group in the western hemisphere lie in
La Violencia. La Violencia was a transformative period in Colombian history that
accelerated economic and social trends began during the peace of the early 20 th
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century despite the bloodshed. In addition to greater economic development and global
trade increased domestic politics became more widely secular that had been a
longstanding cleavage between left and right for 150 years.219 A new political rivalry was
created at the cessation of hostilities as the Liberal-Conservative divide was replaced by
a new power-sharing agreement known as the National Front. Nevertheless, new more
radical leftist groups splintered from the Liberals. Newer leftist groups were excluded
from acceptable mainstream politics so then they rebelled against successive National
Front governments. In this fasion domestic politics fit into the wider Cold War struggle.
By the mid 1990s the FARC had reached its zenith of power. It was one of the
strongest and wealthiest insurgent groups in the world. Its roots can be traced to a
radical liberal faction from the time of La Violencia. At this time the FARC’s longtime
leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez “Sureshot” (birth name Pedro Antonio Marín) was a
rising star in leftist guerilla circles of the 1950s. What would become the nucleus of the
FARC shared a goal of defending peasants it was sympathetic to from government
violence.220 The FARC has its roots in the peasant groups that organized the armed
defense of their land. This social component of the FARC undoubtedly means a strong
ascendant of the peasant culture within the organization.221 Indeed, 90 percent of FARC
member are villagers of indigenous descent and the remainder are middle class
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urbanites.222 In this way the composition of the FARC is unique among leftist guerilla
groups. Most notable of long desired reforms were land reform, but radicals also wanted
strategic resources nationalized and an end to foreign economic involvement in their
country by Americans and Europeans. The ideology of Marulanda’s group was heavily
influenced by the popularity of communist thought in the developing world and they
were also inspired by the recent Chinese Revolution.
As of their second conference, the FARC has a bylaw that defines its
organizational structure, which has been complemented and updated in the following
conferences. The overall body has a hierarchical structure made up of the following:
central staff commander, block commander, front commander, column commander,
company commander, guerilla commander, and squad commander. A political cell
works from the basic unit of the organization which is the squad, made up of 12
members. All member of FARC from this unit to the main central state form a part of a
cell. Training of new recruits is of a political-military nature, i.e. guerrillas and
commanders are required to have both skill-sets and perform both roles as a political
and military leader. In practice, however, this has not been the case due to the
dynamics of war have required the military considerations to outweigh political ones.223
Over time, leadership has had to reshape elements of the group in response to learned
lessons and changes to society.
FARC claimed to be the guerilla organization that has the largest number of
women and their presence has been visible since its foundation. Starting in 1985,
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women began to form part of the organization as guerillas.224 This level of inclusion was
fought for by female members who had previously been sidelined to domestic service
positions. In addition to women’s expanded combat role they also contributed in
communications and IT positions and on average they were more highly educated.225
However, females were still forbidden to have relationships with men not in the
organization—a rule that does not apply to their male comrades. As well as being more
female than many armed groups, it is a young persons’ organization: most of the
combat commanders at the front level are young people of 20, 22, or 25 years.226 This
guerilla organization recognizes that it has children of under 15 in its ranks too.
According to FARC, in most cases they are orphaned children or victims of violent
actions.227
There is much speculation when it comes to the amount of money FARC
handled, about how they obtain resources to finance the organization, about how they
manage their assets and invest money. According to Jesús Antonio Bejarano, “The
reality is that we have an ambiguous idea of the guerilla’s finances and their real
magnitudes. Everybody speculates about how much comes from a kidnapping, how
much for drug trafficking, or extortion, but these are only estimates”. Semana Magazine
conducted a special report on FARC’s finances compiled from intelligence reports and
interviews in which it concluded, amongst other findings, that the organization practices
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money laundering widely.228 FARC has a solid financial position with an efficient
administration at the central level that allows them freedom of action without having to
depend on international aid for their operations. The centralization of finances in FARC
has two main advantages: on the one hand, the concentration of income facilitates the
control, investment, the more equitable management of resources, and the proportion of
a common budget as a whole, in accordance with the needs of its members and the
expense of its operations. When Law 002, a policy the FARC termed a war tax, was
promulgated segments of Colombian society as diverse as the church, media, and
private industry were concerned about how the “tax” may implicate them in funding
FARC. FARC’s relationship with illicit crops and the drug trafficking economy is a
dynamic process that has had different stages.

4.3 FARC Enters the Cocaine Trade
Prior to the mid 1980s, FARC was nearly a different group from before that point.
Before this time, it was a weak leftist militant group until their transition into the coca
industry developed it into a vigorous rebel movement. This is partly due to the wilting of
the Colombian state, but also a great deal of the group’s success should be attributed to
its new found fortune from the narcotics industry, extortion of MNCs, and kidnap for
ransom.229 The group’s strategic dominance in the southern provinces of Guaviare,
Putumayo, and Caquetá allowed it to control chief areas of coca and poppy
production.230 From 1998 to 2002 the government allowed the FARC to operate freely in
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the zona de distension, a territory approximately the size of Switzerland, as part of a
broader lowering of hostilities to seek peace between the central government and
FARC. However, by this point the FARC’s infrastructure and logistical network used for
the drug trade had been established for an entire decade. In practice the declared
cease fire provided FARC the space and safety to expand their power over rural villages
and cocaine operations. Through the drug trade the FARC reinforced their traditional
support for peasant farmers who have few economic opportunities for advancement
outside of coca or poppy cultivation partially due to an ecosystem inhospitable to other
crops.231 In return for their advocacy of peasants the FARC receives a portion of the
profits from campesinos, peasant farmers. In response to the United States’ Plan
Colombia, designed to substantially reduce the drug trade in Colombia, the FARC
spoke out against aerial fumigation sorties designed to eradicate illicit drugs in the
country. For an in-depth discussion on this policy see Vargas Meza’s 1999 book
Fumigación y conflico: Politicas antidrogas y deslegitimación del estado en Colombia.
Unfortunately, for the governments of Colombia and the US evidence suggests that the
fumigation policy pushed campesinos deeper into the arms of their FARC protectors.
Fumigation campaigns by the Colombian Army targeting marijuana, poppy, and
coca began in 1978 and since the late 1990s have been assisted by the United States
through its efforts to combat drug use. Such decades long efforts have not had the
desired effect of curtailing production by large landowners or peasants and in fact the
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social consequences of fumigation have been destabilizing to those who grow forbidden
crops, according to many including Vargas Meza.232 In particular, with fumigation
sorties, that utilized several chemicals over time, farmers who grew illegal crops were
often forced deeper into rural, more mountainous areas to continue their work or moved
to cities to pursue alternative jobs that often did not pay as well what could be made
from growing cash crops.233 Also, in many cases poisons not only hit coca plants but
also vegetable gardens, yucca fields, livestock, and water sources of the locals. As
many farmers of illicit crops live in areas under rebel control or contested lands, the
destructive actions of the government pushed farmers loyalties away from the
government to the rebels.
The FARC’s ability to raise vast sums of money from narco-trafficking made them
wealthy and financially independent so that they did not require support from the Soviet
Union or Castro’s Cuba. This hallmark was unlike other leftist groups in Latin America
that were disadvantaged by the end of the Cold War as large sources of their revenue
disappeared from friendly state sponsors. From the 1990s thereon the FARC would rely
upon more diverse sources of income of kidnappings, extorting MNCs that operated in
FARC territory. “Tribute” demanded by the FARC from firms operating within their
territory is a practice they formalized with the declaration of Law 002.234 This additional
income stream raised new funds at a time when the FARC’s drug trade was attacked by
a combination of the Colombian state and right-wing militias. Naming this
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institutionalized extortion, a law gave an impression of legality such as would come from
a genuine government.235
The FARC’s relationship with narco-trafficking was historically complex.
Generally, the components of the organization took a 10 percent tax in exchange for “
‘law’, order, and protection to populations involved in coca cultivation, chemical
processing of raw coca into raw cocaine, as well as distribution.”236 This topic is too
broad and complex to properly cover here, but we can provide a general understanding
of FARC’s basic involvement in the industry. As narco-trafficking expanded in the 1980s
so did too FARC’s military prowess and territorial influence. A former member recalled
that by the mid 1980s the group-controlled Guaviare and Meta as well as the Serranía
de San Lucas, Bota Caucana, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.237 These were all areas
where previously the FARC had no presence. In addition to these areas, FARC quickly
arrived in Choco, Bolivar, and the two Santanders.238
Here, an important note about the scope of the FARC’s involvement in the drug
trade is needed particularly as it compares to other narco-trafficking activities in
Colombia at the same time because there are many inaccurate assumptions regarding
FARC’s level of involvement in narcotics trafficking that deserve clarification. Firstly,
only some members were involved in the narcotrafficking. Secondly, as was mentioned
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above, those elements of the FARC that participated in the drug trade did so to initially
to “protect and regulate” the industry.239 Additionally, by the mid 1980s cartels including
Pablo Escobar’s began developing their own in-house security operations so that they
would not need to sub-contract with the FARC. According to Rochlin, this change was
primarily made for ideological reasons as the narco kingpins identified as leading
capitalists of their country making their relationship with the socialist FARC uneasy.
Since its inception the FARC vigorously demanded land reforms that would break-up
the nation’s largest agricultural estates that by the 1980s were owned by narcotraffickers in many cases. It was for this reason that the narcos financially supported the
new paramilitaries developed in that decade to check the leftist ELN and FARC, but to
also supplant their role as enforcers to for the narcos.
To quantify the group’s dependence on different revenue sources is not simple
because accounting illegal sources of income is difficult due to the fact that those
numbers are secret and obviously not reported to either the Colombian government or
an independent NGO. Also, revenue streams change over time as with a firm operating
in a legal market. According to a 2003 study, 48 percent of the FARC’s budget was from
the drug trade, 37 percent from extortion of businesses, nine percent from KfR, and six
percent from cattle theft.240 Five years later, those figures increased to between 60 to 90
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percent for drug related activities and 20 percent for kidnappings.241 Despite the group
dedicating its members to the “in-house” work of kidnapping and extortion, FARC does
not have vertical integration of its drug business. The specific degree of involvement in
the production chain of cocaine depends on the particular FARC front, at which time,
and which author is consulted. What there is a large degree of agreement upon is that
FARC has “limited domestic drug activities and that the group relies on autonomous
criminal organizations to distribute and traffic” of narcotics.242 Generally, the majority of
FARC’s drug-related income derived from a tax to protect production and trafficking
activities.243
The centralization of finances in FARC distinguishes it from the militias and has
two main advantages: On the one hand, the concentration of income facilitates the
control, investment, the more equitable management of resources, and the proportion of
a common budget as a whole, in accordance with the needs of its members and the
expense of its operations. A fundamental difference between the how the cartels
manage funds and how the FARC manages funds is that for FARC revenue gained by
the drug trade is used reinvested while revenues of the cartels turn into profit. Finally, if
this system of administration of its resources manages to meet the criteria of equity,
solidarity, transparency, and efficiency, as expressed by its command.244
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A 2007 UN World Drug report stated that while there is concern about
international trafficking and trading drugs for arms, especially on account of the
paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), that work is mostly domestic and
the bulk of the trafficking is done by a large number of small, professional cartels known
as the “baby cartels”.245 The paramilitaries drug business was vertically integrated from
crop production to distribution.246 In particular, the AUC acquired 30 percent of its
revenue from protection payments of the landholding class and 70 percent from drug
activities, though estimates of this net income varied widely from US$ 20 million to US$
200 million.247 It oversaw the growth, refinement, and international trafficking of its own
product. Integration of the cocaine business within the AUC was more pronounced than
it was for the FARC that traded protection for cash or arms with Colombian and other
Latin American crime syndicates.248
Stepping back for a moment form discussion on the FARC’s relationship to drug
trafficking, how has the organization’s use of KfR developed since the mid 2000s and
how does that contribute to the wider story? As part of President Uribe’s wider strategy
to defeat the armed group, the Colombian military enjoyed widespread success in large
battles and in targeted assassinations with financial support from the United States with
its Plan Colombia. Uribe’s successor Juan Manuel Santos resurrected negotiations to

245.

2007 World Drug Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (June
2007), 177.
246.
247

See supra note 15, 81.

. See supra note 14, 466.

248.

See supra note 14, 467.

105
reach a lasting peace with the FARC in early 2012—peace talks had withered on the
vine for a decade after the FARC commandeered a commercial airliner and kidnapped
many passengers on board. As the two sides explored negotiations the FARC discretely
announced it would end 35 years of financing their organization through KfR. More
specifically, this language rescinded Law 002, which taxed or extorted those over a
certain income; however, what that certain amount was is unclear even reaching middle
income citizens.
This declaration, according to Steven Dudley of InSight Crime, reflects the
FARCs already decreased reliance on KfR as a once significant source of income.249
Nevertheless, not all FARC fronts adhered to that policy that was aimed at softening the
FARC’s image in the eyes of the Colombian public. In light of FARC’s already lowered
number of kidnappings since the year 2000, as of the early 2010s, and the unpopularity
of kidnappings, ending the practice was good politics for the organization and reflected
a small concession to the peace process with little cost. Colombia’s GUALA, the
nation’s national police, accused some FARC fronts of contracting with the ELN in KfR
in addition to continuing the practice of “retentions” (the guerilla term for kidnapping) in
their own right.250 This was occurring as the majority of members follow the rule of the
Secretariat’s newer stance against kidnapping and as total number of cases continued
to fall in the country.251
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As the Colombian military won more confrontations with the FARC on their own
turf in the countryside this decreased the group’s overall presence to smaller areas of
control and precipitously decreased the number of guerillas by more than half over the
decade from the early 2000s to the early 2010s. This change can be seen graphically
above beginning in the year 2002 to 2003 when the decision was made to take back the
demilitarized zone centered in the El Caguan region, which the FARC had used as a
safe haven from the government.252 One effect this had was to deny the FARC land on
which to detain hostages for extended periods of time—further limiting its ability to raise
funds and continue its fight against the Colombian state. Additionally, from 2000 to 2012
the demographics of the FARC’s Colombian kidnapping victims increasingly came from
the middle and lower classes who can only afford to pay $5,000 on average, according
to the government.253 If this estimate is accurate and if the government is correct in
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tabulating that the FARC commits 25% of all kidnappings in the country then the FARC
would only bring in approximately $350,000 annually from KfR compared to a sum
between $200-$600 million from drug trafficking activities. Therefore, it is easy to
understand why the guerillas were willing to recent their unpopular “law”. Peace
negotiations between the Santos administration and the FARC commenced and faltered
several times from 2012 to 2015 culminating in a peace accord in 2016, yet some
1,200-3,000 members are still active in fighting the state, according to InSight Crime.254

4.4 Enter the “Narco-subs”
There is possibly no more unique development from FARC’s relationship to
drugs the past 30 years than the narco-subs. They represent a continuation of
clandestine efforts to move cocaine out of Colombia through Central America to the
United States besides other routes less well-worn than land routes. This innovation is
an impressive accomplishment by a dark network’s ability to engineer a complex
solution to maneuver around state control. According to Jaramillo, FARC’s narco-subs
demonstrate: “1) relevant data on FARC’s ability to engage in a complex effort and 2)
takes into account the organization limitations and constraints that may influence the
technical capabilities and activities of the clandestine organization.” Narcoticssubmarines are “custom made, self-propelled maritime vessels” for the purpose of
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smuggling drugs along the coast of Central America to points in the United States.255
Early designs consisted of semi-submergible vessels built on speed boats hulls
constructed in jungle clearings. Current designs feature GPS navigation and modern
radar, fully submergible construction, and self-propulsion giving them capabilities of
traveling long distances.256
It became clear by the 1990s that air and sea smuggling routes no longer
allowed the FARC to make large uninhibitedly shipments. Furthermore, land routes
have always remained an arduous, lengthy option. Additionally, familiar methods of
maneuvering around authorities through bribing or coercing border guards, concealing
drugs in cargo containers, and use of underground tunnels became increasingly
unpopular as experiments with narco-subs proved promising.257 For these reasons,
narco-subs became an ever more popular mode of transporting large and expensive
quantities of cocaine through the 2000s for a group not normally acknowledged as
implanting the most modern technologies. Authorities are unaware of which or how
many FARC fronts employ narco-subs. However, due to their high construction costs
and degree of engineering expertise required to build narco-subs it is likely that
coordination occurs between the central leadership and perhaps multiple operational
units. Such a degree of coordination should make it easier to spread the costs
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necessary for construction and transporting large quantities of drugs over the open
sea.258
FARC’s development of narco-subs represents an impressive long-term strategic
effort to overcome significant obstacles to their trade that was vital to their ongoing war
against the Colombian state. More impressive still is the subsequent innovations to the
original submarine design and adoption of new communication, propulsion, and radar
features. A former drug trafficker observed that, “Looking back, it appears that the
Colombian cartel was honing their skills in preparation for their ultimate goal – the
construction of a long-distance vessel that could dive and surface on command.”259
Since the beginning of peace talks between the Colombian government and the
guerrillas in 2016, there have been four stages of narco-sub development with each
evolution building on the successes and avoiding the failures of the previous generation
that ultimately lead to a fully submersible vessel.
As it so happened, the steep up-front cost paled in comparison to the enormous
expected revenue made from a single shipment of cocaine.260 Ramirez estimates that it
costs less than $2 million to build a vessel capable of carrying eight tones of drugs and
that one shipment will fetch over $200 million in revenue.261 As the subs notoriety grew
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there have been reports of the FARC selling narco-subs or their plans to friendly dark
networks that diversified the FARC’s income streams and adds to greater revenue.262
This development illustrates practically how technologies spread from one armed group
to another.
Jaramillo continues that FARC found success for four primary reasons: Firstly, as
it has been noted several times earlier, the FARC committed considerable financial and
human resources into the narco-sub project on which they placed great hopes. Not only
were such resources marshaled to construct prototypes but this continued for a period
of over two decades. Secondly, the FARC exercised a great deal of influence in the
areas of the country they occupied, so much so, that locals in adjacent villages feared
speaking to authorities about the secretive construction nearby.263 In this manner, plans
were executed more smoothly under clandestine conditions. For instance, in 2008 a
submarine was seized containing four naval engineers who all claimed they had been
kidnapped and coerced into building narco-submarines.264 Thirdly, the FARC under the
Joint Western Command, based around the Pacific coast, was able to conceal
construction of their boats from authorities. Clandestine work and intimidation enabled
them to continue building without disruption from locals. Fourthly, as mentioned before,
the FARC exhibited an extraordinary capacity in the group’s learning individually and
corporately.
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4.5 Taliban Origins
It was the hope of many Afghans that a movement of Islamic students would
bring peace and order to their country that was in such chaos after the previous
communist regime had been overthrown by the mujahedeen in April 1992.265
Afghanistan in the early 1990s before the Taliban’s consolidation of control was a state
teetering on the edge of collapse. Mujahedeen warlords fought for independence from
the Soviet Union during the 1980s were widely seen as corrupt and their factionalism
severely weakened the country. Before the Taliban rose to power a patchwork of allied
warlords ruled the country who frequently switched sides, fought their own former
comrades and then switched sides again. In the northeast and east President
Burhanuddin Rabbani controlled the mainly ethnic Tajik provinces centered around the
capital Kabul. The three most west-ward provinces centered around the city of Herat
were controlled by Ismael Khan. In the south near the Pakistan border three provinces
were controlled by a shura (council) of mujahideen located at Jalalabad. Finally, a small
area to the southeast of Kabul was controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. In the north,
Uzbek General Rashid Dostum controlled six provinces and for a period of time was
allied with the Rabbani government, but abandoned it to side with Hikmatyar. Southern
Afghanistan near the Pakistani border centered around Kandahar was controlled by
“dozens of petty ex-mujahideen warlords” which plundered the local population
willingly.266
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The origins of the Taliban come from the southern Afghan city of Kandahar in
1994 as a small group of madrassa students turned vigilantes during a lawless post-war
time in that country. Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a hitherto
unimpressive man from the obscure village Nodeh outside Kandahar born
approximately in 1959. From a humble family, Omar’s parents were landless peasants
of the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai branch of Pashtuns.267 During the course of the war with
the Soviet Union Omar’s family moved to Tarinkot in Urozgan Province to escape the
conflict. Urozgan is one of the most remote regions of Afghanistan, so few Soviets ever
entered that province. From 1989 to 1992 Omar fought for Hizb-e-Islami against the
Soviet supported Najibullah regime and was wounded four times including one that
famously took his left eye.
The Taliban’s original members were composed of Mullah Omar’s madrassa
students who grew up during the chaotic period of war with the Soviet Union and
subsequent government collapse afterwards in the early 1990s. Multiple origin stories
surround the beginning of the Taliban in Kandahar. They all express the same idea that
Omar and his talabs, as some sources refer to early followers, brought justice to lawless
Kandahar by punishing sinful men. Many pupils grew up living in refugee camps in
Pakistan outside the traditional Afghan communities that taught and supported native to
traditions and customs. Omar himself had little formal religious education; nevertheless,
he opened a school for teenage pupils. As the Taliban’s fame grew their prestige
increased in the eyes of the locals because the student fighters did not ask for any
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monetary rewards, but only help from local communities in making a better Islamic
society.
The men who joined Omar’s movement were children of the jihad who were
disaffected with old mujahideen leaders whom allowed crime and disorder to run
rampant throughout the land. In the opinion of many in the younger generation their
leaders failed because they had fallen into corruption and excess; consequently, they
fell short of the goal of implementing an authentic Afghan Islamic society. Those
mujahideen dissatisfied with the status quo understood themselves as continuing the
jihad that cleared Afghanistan of the invasion of communism and the Red Army.268 In
Pakistani madrassas (religious school) pupils studied what life would look like in an
ideal Islamic society prescribed by the Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago. This is the
society the Taliban deeply desire to imitate. Based on these difficult life experiences and
the political discussions around what should be done to help the state of their country
an agenda developed: restore peace, disarm the population, enforce sharia, and
maintain the Islamic character of Afghanistan.”269
The Taliban has relied on several key religious texts in addition to the Quran and
Islamic history for inspiration for the movement and guidance for administration and
jurisprudence. Islamic Justice teaches on these points as well as how to promote good
and punish evil in the population.270 A later text, Shariat Teaching on Jihad, draws on
similar literature as Islamic Justice to instruct readers on how to distribute loot and when
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to make and break ceasefires.271 Obedience to the Amir is another influential paper by
Pakistani scholar Mufti Rasheed Ahmed is the main source for guidance for the
Taliban’s internal affairs particularly in terms of the relationship between mujahid and
amir.272 Mufti Rasheed Ahmad toured the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and continued
to act as a spiritual leader to the Taliban’s leadership even after the group lost control of
the country.
Obedience to the Amir is both a practical handbook on how the Taliban
movement should be run and also a heroic origin story of how the group’s leaders came
to implementing sharia in Afghanistan against imperialist forces. The term amir to Mufti
Ahmad refers to the Amir ul Momineen (at that time Mullah Omar) as well as the
broader leadership of the organization for who the mujahideen owed their allegiance.
Such submission to authority and unity within the group is right because the amir is
appointed by God so he can be trusted to make decisions that may be understood by
lower ranking members whom do not have divinely revealed knowledge of the supreme
leader. One’s obedience to leadership and cohesiveness within the group is akin to
remaining in the fold of Islam, according to Rashhed Ahmad. The organizational
structure advanced by the author was hierarchical and simple. All members owed their
allegiance to an amir who sat in a college of equals that report to an amir ul momineen.
In addition to this leadership apparatus, the shura council should play a purely advisory
role to the amir who has full authority in making decisions for the group
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Mufti Rasheed Ahmad also contributed to the development of Taliban internal
affairs by developing Islamic thinking around organizational design. For instance, he
advocated for the regular rotation of civilian administrative personnel among military
fronts in order to continually imbue those not in combat roles from with a fighting spirit
and to prevent distance from growing between the back office and the front-lines.273 The
significance for rapid overturn in service of office workers was to retain the sense of
urgency of jihad to those members. Closely related to the above idea is Mufti Ahmad’s
notion of the benefits of the Taliban’s spartan lifestyle so as not to make any one
position too comfortable, desirable, or to fuel flames of ambition of any Taliban. This
egalitarianism stood in stark contrast to Afghanistan’s rich palace court culture in
imitation of the Turkish sultan’s splendor and also in contrast to the corruption and
lavish lifestyles of mujahideen leaders of the 1980s and 1990s. So it was that partially
through the influence of the spiritual leader Rasheed Ahmad that the leadership of
Taliban amirs, who are poorly educated religious men, adopted his ideas to their
organization of unity, hierarchy, service, and austerity.
The composition and especially the demographics of the Taliban have little
changed since their beginnings through nearly the present.274 These men who make up
the highest levels of the Taliban leadership mostly came of age in Pakistan be educated
in madrassas of the Deobandi variety although not really progressing far in that pursuit
and they were motivated to action by a zeal to implement a fairer, more just, virtuously
Islamic society in their homeland. However, lower-level commanders not at the national
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level are still a majority of Pashtun ethnicity but not of the Kandahar Province; so, at the
middle and lower levels of Taliban leadership there is a greater emphasis on
representing the local populace.275
As it has been mentioned above, today the highest two levels of Taliban
leadership are men who were mostly active in the movement during the days of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001) who were also early arrivals to Mullah
Omar’s Kandahar City-based movement. Insomuch as the organization is described as
a movement of mullahs. It is because of this set of leaders. In Afghanistan, the term
mullah is a general title referring to one who has had some indeterminate amount of
religious education. Actually, based on a study of Afghan Taliban leadership those not
comprising the senior most positions are more highly educated than the core
leadership. That is, the mawlvi or qualified cleric and even more senior judges who are
part of the ulema are under the direction of those who are essentially madrassa dropouts.276 At the level of walis (provincial governor), or more accurately in most cases
shadow governor, these men have a less developed background in the madrassas but
what is prized most for selecting these commanders is their loyalty to the cause and
ability their as military leaders.277 This information is difficult to come by, particularly as
the Taliban has the habit of rotating mid-level leadership throughout the country, yet
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much of the evidence regarding the Taliban’s human resources was provided to Michael
Semper by two former Taliban leaders turned informants.278
Afghanistan’s infamous opium industry has its origins in the Pakistani drug trade
of the 1980s, which was introduced to Afghanistan by the war with the Soviet Union. At
that time Pakistan was producing 800 metric tons of opium annually that accounted for
an astounding 70 percent of global supply until 1989.279 Over that decade a corrupt
system developed, which intersected global politics, regional security, and a
multinational drug trafficking business. The truck, donkey, and camel caravans that
transported CIA purchased weapons into Afghanistan from Pakistan carried away
heroin to Karachi’s port for worldwide export. Cultivation of poppy and its production into
opium and heroin crisscrossed the same routes controlled by Pashtun tribes that were
paid-off to allow arms moved through their lands.280 Remarkably, both the mujahideen
and communist officers in the Afghan military participated and profited in this early stage
of the drug trade. It would be impossible for the governments in Kabul, Islamabad,
Moscow, and Washington D.C. not to know about the burgeoning narcotics industry in
Pakistan, but at that time drugs were an acceptable negative externality of the greater
civil war in Afghanistan.
From 1992 to 1995, Afghanistan produced between 2,200 and 2,400 metric tons
of heroin annually; an amount that rivaled Burma as the largest producer worldwide.281

278.

Ibid, 19.

279.

Ibid, 120.

280.

Ibid, 121.

281.

Ibid, 119.

118
According to the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) Kandahar Province
produced 120 metric tons in 1996 on 3.160 hectares of poppy compared to the previous
year’s 79 metric tons from 2,460 hectares. Following this in 1997 as Taliban control
extended farther north past Kabul, opium output rose to 2,800 metric tons, an increase
of 25 percent. As tens of thousands of refugees returned from Pakistan, they took-up
poppy farming as it was the “easiest and most lucrative cash crop available.” 282
However, the extraordinary amount of heroin produced in country did not lead to
financial freedom for poppy farmers. Only an estimated 1 percent of total profits were
kept by farmers with the overwhelming majority going to European and North American
narcotics dealers.283 Tax receipts are estimated to have been US$ 20 million for the
Taliban with an unknown, probably greater amount, collected as bribes.284
The Taliban quickly realized the importance and potential poppy cultivation had
in the economy after they captured Kandahar. Initially, they outlawed the use and
production of all drugs, which led optimistic American diplomats to quickly attempt to
establish lines of communication with the nascent conquers for the purpose of
eliminating large scale poppy growth. Throughout the 1980s, mujahideen warlords
profited as an open secret from the drug trade to fund their armies and line their
pockets. They purchased expensive villas in Peshawar and kept foreign bank accounts.
In public, commanders would admonish one another for indulging in the dirty drug trade.
Within a few months Mullah Oman and the Taliban recognized the value of poppy and
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how its illegality angered local farmers.285 From that point forward, the Taliban
participated more heavily in the drug trade than any mujahideen before them.
The Taliban were able to develop a purely Islamic reason for farmers to grow
opium despite the Quran forbidding production and consumption of intoxicants. Abdul
Rashid, the leader of Kandahar’s anti-drug task force, explained the duty of his post to
enforce the law forbidding hashish, “because it is consumed by Afghans and
Muslims.”286 Nevertheless, “opium is permissible because it is consumed by kefirs
(unbelievers) in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.”287 Furthermore, he
continued, “We let people cultivate poppy because farmers get good prices. We cannot
push the people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising against the Taliban if we
forced them to stop poppy cultivation. So, we grow opium and get our wheat from
Pakistan.”288
Taxes from the opium trade with Afghanistan’s neighbors contributed
handsomely to the Taliban’s treasury during their government – reportedly a box
beneath Mullah Omar’s bed. In 1995 the UNDCP estimated revenue from the Afghan
drug trade totaled US$1.35 billion.289 By 1998 revenue had more than doubled to US$3
billion.290 Drug money was critical for filling the voracious appetite for weapons,
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materiel, and recruits for the war between the Taliban and its various internal
adversaries, most notable of which was the Northern Alliance commanded by Ahmed
Shah Massoud. In addition to the lucrative drug trade, smuggling sophisticated routes
stretching from Central Asia to the Gulf remains a major economic sector in the country
and profitable source for taxes. Despite the vast amount of money acquired over this
period the Taliban leadership continued to live as ascetics. Their lifestyle was in stark
contrast to the lavish lifestyles enjoyed by many other warlords of the civil war period.
Additionally, the drug smugglers themselves became enormously wealthy from the
Afghan narcotic trade.
Some Taliban leaders did attempt to grow local industries and foreign investment
besides the existing war-time trades. “We want to develop Afghanistan as a modern
state and we have enormous mineral, oil, and gas resources which should interest
foreign investors”, said Mullah Ahmed Jan, Minister of Mines and Industries, a Saudi
who left his carpet business to join the Taliban.291 He added that, “Before we took
control of the south there was no factory working in the country. Now we have reopened
mines and carpet factories with the help of the Pakistani and Afghan traders.” However,
there was never serious interest from the organization’s heads in the powerful Kandahar
Shura.292 Jan concluded that the shura had little time for economic issues as they were
too interested in the war.
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4.6 The Opium Trade Surges
The Taliban after 2001 was given an open door to reemerge due to three critical
shortfalls of: Afghans’ displeasure with the Karzai government, security shortfalls made
by the US and ISAF, and modification of Taliban ideology to a more nationalist and
moderate stance on social issues.293 With continued lack of economic development
southern and eastern regions remained reliant on the drug trade that was once again
prohibited by the American supported central government. This decision predictably
angered local farmers who were formally forbidden from growing their most profitable
crop in the country. Naturally, the Taliban took advantage of this situation by
encouraging the drug trade that benefited local farmers, once again contributing
handsomely to the organization’s treasury and regaining support as an alternative to the
new Karzai government amongst a large segment of the population. In the early 2000s
the Taliban were able to regroup as NATO forces were insufficient to occupy a country
the size of France as part of the “light footprint” distribution of Western military
presence. With a shortage of foreign forces to enforce peace, the Taliban were able to
make the case to local communities that they were the ones to restore justice to lawless
areas as they had done before in the mid 1990s.294 In response to the new political and
military dynamics in Afghanistan, the Taliban changed their messaging from
conservative zealots to God-fearing nationalists intent on expelling foreign invaders, not
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unlike the mujahideen of yester yore.295 In this narrative the Karzai government is a
patsie of the Westerns whom are undermining traditional Afghan society.
The kidnapping of foreigners and Afghans is common across the country by the
Taliban or criminal gangs. Ransom demands by the Taliban usually fit into some
combination of three spaces for money, the release of Taliban prisoners by the
government or United States, or as a reprisal for cooperation with the Afghan
government or Americans. Of the foreigners who are abducted they tend to come from,
engineers, aid workers, or military contractors working in the country. Afghan hostages
are typically local government officials or civilians and in these cases ransom demands
are commonly made to the national government because most Afghans do not have the
means to pay ransoms. A notable hostage case that made international headlines was
that of the Korean missionaries who were abducted in 19 July 2007 while the group of
23 were en route through disputed territory in Ghazni Province. Two men were killed
within the beginning weeks and two women were set free to the International Red Cross
for the purpose of building goodwill with the Korean government. A month earlier, two
German engineers were captured with one having been killed. A Taliban spokesman,
Qari Yousef Ahmadi, demanded 21 of his compatriots be released for the freedom of
the 19 remaining Koreans—a demand that several members of the Afghan rejected
outright.296 “Our position is the same: We are not releasing [any Taliban]”, said Ghazni

295

. Ibid, 327.

296.

Associated Press, “Taliban Free Two South Korean Women Among 23
Kidnapped in Afghanistan in July,” Aug. 13, 2007.

123
Governor Marajudin Pathan.297 It was reported, but not confirmed by the South Korean
government, that the hostages were released in return for USD$20 million.
A remarkable kidnapping of 70 villagers occurred in southern Kandahar Province
for reportedly cooperating with the authorities. Seven were killed and another 30 were
then released, according to Abdul Raziq, the head of the Kandahar Province Police. 298
This occurred in the context of generally higher civilian casualties even for Afghanistan
since the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province in 2015. A report from the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 1,662 civilians died in the first six months of
2017, and 3,581 were injured.299 Many mass kidnappings have occurred in 2016
through 2019, especially along the country’s many desolate motorways, after the
majority of the security responsibility came to ANSF from ISAF. Indeed, at the end of
2019 27 peace activists from a group called People’s Peace Movement were abducted
while traveling between Farah and Herat provinces. The Taliban earlier accused the
new group of being financially supported by the Kabul government and therefore pawns
or in league with foreigners.
During the Taliban’s resurgence their “level of dependence [on the drug
economy] grew dramatically.” It had always been their largest source of income; greater
so than gifts from foreign governments, human trafficking, or kidnap for ransom. Opium
played a crucial role in reinvigorating the Taliban movement from near extension, and
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transformed the insurgency across the Afghan-Pakistan border into something new.300
Indeed, this dependence led to what is widely portrayed as the “New Taliban”.
What is today known as the Taliban shares some of the organizational
characteristics and political aspirations to their predecessors.301 “These are not the old
Taliban. We don’t even know who they are anymore.”302 Mohammed Omar remained
the titular head of the organization until his death in 2010 and he established a new
shura in Quetta, Pakistan to replace the original council in Kandahar that had been
scattered after the American invasion. The men of the new shura were more
independent than those in the earlier shura because they were responsible for
managing their own theatres of war, e.g. Jalaluddin Haqqani for the southeast and
Mullah Dadullah for the south.303 The New Taliban is more fragmented both
geographically and in terms of interests than its earlier iteration that engage in all kinds
of activities from terrorism, racketeering, and kidnapping to smuggling. According to the
same Afghan defense official, “We could round up the entire Quetta shura, and we
would be no closer to ending the insurgency.” Nowadays, the Taliban can be seen
destroying ancient Buddha statues in northwest Pakistan, smuggling goods into Central
Asia, or bombing a police station in Kabul.304 It is not uncommon for some individuals
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who call themselves Taliban, or are referred to by locals, to communicate little with
Taliban headquarters.305 They may have more to do with corrupt local officials and fight
with other local insurgents who also claim to be Taliban.
Evidence that drugs have altered the Taliban can be detected even at the fringes
of the organization in the ideology of the Taliban. The Globe and Mail newspaper of
Canada surveyed a small number of low-level Taliban soldiers and supporters finding
that one-fifth of respondents grew poppy because their mullahs instructed them to do as
such. 16 individuals responded that they hoped to make heroin addicts of non-Muslims.
Said interviewee, Soldier 18, “It is obvious to everyone that the Americans hate poppies.
And if we grow it…it will be better for us and worse for them.” This sentiment was made
clear by Abdul Rashid in the 1990s. Soldier 19 said too, “Islam says not to grow it and
we are not opposed to Islam, but our ulema (clerics) says to grow it because it is
harmful to non-Muslims.”306
Most consumer products are difficult to find in Afghanistan after decades of war.
Taliban fighters often barter their service for food, weapons, motor bikes, and fuel. In an
interview with al Jazeera journalist Qais Azimy, who traveled with Taliban fighters in
Helmand Province, quoted one fighter as saying, “Everything we have is from opium.”307
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According to the same source those soldiers also received a Toyota Corolla in which
the men traveled. Traffickers and the Taliban form such a symbiotic relationship that the
traffickers will cover larger expenses than even automobiles. High level traffickers will
pay for the medical bills of injured Taliban, and at least one trafficker built a medical
clinic in Quetta, Pakistan that provides care for injured solders.308 Other traffickers have
built madrassas both in Afghanistan and Pakistan in part to recruit new members;
others have built hotels in Pakistan for Taliban to rest and relax from their time on the
battlefield. Though battlefield commanders are heavily reliant upon drug money, says
an Afghan intelligence official, for daily expenses the senior leadership still requires
“donations from rich Arabs in the Gulf and Pakistan.”309
Afghanistan’s drug trade also makes strange competitors and customers of
traditional allies and foes. The complex relationship between the Taliban and the
Afghan government was alluded to in a UN report about drug corruption in the Karzai
administration. It details 36 districts in poppy producing areas, or along smuggling
routes, where an intricate series of kickbacks from police officers, to customs officers, to
governors each enrich themselves.310 It continued to further explain how men with the
choicest assignments stood to become wealthy from accepting bribes in their public
positions and how those in lower positions were required to provide cuts of their own
graft to superiors. Police officers stationed in lucrative areas were sometimes obligated
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to pay as much as $40,000 a month to keep their jobs.311 This report pinpointed the
man at the top of this corrupt public system was Ahmed Wali Karzai, the former
president’s half-brother who was assassinated in 2011. Multiple US and NATO
intelligence reports provide evidence the junior Karzai made drug deals via
telephone.312 This information has been corroborated by western diplomats. As is
common to other high-ranking government officials you won’t see Ahmed Wali Karzai
actually touching the trade,” said a UN official who worked on the report.313 Finally, the
UN official concluded, “He has influence over who gets what position — and that gives
him extraordinary power.”
Corrupt public officials and the Taliban do not negotiate face-to-face about drug
smuggling. Conversely, the parties use smugglers as messengers to negotiate how
much product will be moved and at what time and where. Saboo Agha, a poppy farmer
in Gereshk, Helmand Province explained the operation as he regularly saw it:
“The Taliban commander has the firepower and the drug dealer has the money. The
opium gets transported in police vehicles, or other times I have seen them take the
opium away in convoys with thirty or more armed men. You can see the government
officials have secured the route for them, and next week the local police will have new
clothes or motorcycles.”314
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It is routine for local officials to receive bribes so drugs may move throughout
Afghanistan. One deceptive tactic local police developed to raise cash through the drug
trade is to “sell” districts they are assigned to protect from the local Taliban.315 “They’ll
tell us that they lost control of the area because they are outgunned, but it will be a case
where there aren’t more than ten Taliban in their region, and we have posted a hundred
police to that district,” says a senior interior ministry official in Kabul.316 This situation is
most noticeable, “Along the border, there’s an evil mix of government officials, district
commissioners, and police chiefs who work with the Taliban,” says General Kamal
Sadat, a former counter-narcotic police chief. He went on, “The government officials
mostly just take the bribes. It’s the Taliban and the drug smugglers who actually move
the drugs out.”317
In recent years poppy cultivation has grown to an incredible amount in the south
of the country as local farmers have invested in solar arrays to boost the productivity of
their farms. As early as 2013 farmers began acquiring the new technology to replace
diesel powered water pumps that frequently broke and constituted the largest operating
expense.318 Once the up-front cost of approximately USD$5,000 is used to purchase an
array of panels, that largest cost is neutralized. In 2019, a British security firm, Alcis,
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counted over 67,000 solar arrays in Helmand Valley alone, which does not include
greater southwest Afghanistan where today an estimated two-thirds of total global
supply of opium is grown.319 The potential for profit is having an effect of migration to
the south provinces of the country into areas that were once desert. Before the price of
opium crashed in 2018 from too much supply, Afghanistan produced a bumper crop of
9,000 tones of the drug.320 There is no end in sight for the Taliban’s most profitable
source of income. It remains to be seen how this will effect a well-funded armed group
as all foreign troops are planned to leave the country next year.

4.7 Analysis and Conclusion
Both the FARC and the Taliban were or are prolific practitioners of KfR for
decades. This is evidenced anecdotally and through data dating back now decades.
Nevertheless, in terms of changes to the two groups’ organizational behavior this author
could not locate anything significant in during research. What was discovered, and in
keeping with the same theme of organizational behavior, was the extent to which the
FARC and the Taliban joined in the drug trades in their countries. While KfR is
profitable, especially when a hostage is foreign, it does not come close to the potential
financial gain from narcotics. For those reasons it became necessary to include the
implications of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and Colombia while not forgetting the
primary independent variable kidnap for ransom. How this chapter has accomplished
that goal is by identifying trends and notable cases of the tactic but placing them in
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context of the larger narrative of the FARC’s and the Taliban’s organizational
development from the standpoint of violent activities.
The most evident change to occur for the FARC and Taliban was the increase in
human and materiel resources. For the Taliban this was the case whereby they
attracted many young recruits whom had few other employment options besides fighter.
As Rashid detailed, conventional means of employment and the traditional tribe were
decimated by the Soviet-Afghan War, so a lifestyle of war-fighting was the most
stabilizing element for many who grew up in refugee camps. FARC, after the Seventh
Guerrilla Conference at the time the leadership decided to enter the drug trade the
group formally added the initials EP to the end of its name, for Ejército del Pueblo or
“People’s Army”. From this time forth they would identify themselves as the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army. Such a name change
illustrated a change in tactics to a more aggressive stance whereby the FARC used its
enlarged forces to openly attack the Colombian military in middle-size cites rather than
only operating in rural villages.
Cocaine had a profound effect on the capabilities of the FARC to fight the
Colombian state and even the minor but unique case of narco-subs. Their development
represents an ability to overcome many complex strategic, tactical, and technical
obstacles crucial to maintain the FARC’s competitiveness in the cocaine trade. Success
in this market was moreover central for the group to continue its decades long struggle
against successive Colombian governments. Afghanistan’s terrain is some of the most
challenging in the world containing dry, hot deserts and frigid mountains. Of course, it is
landlocked so the Taliban do not need sea vessels; although, traffickers whom deliver
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heroin from Karachi to Gulf markets do use small ships. Nevertheless, the Taliban are
not reported to use aircraft in transporting their opium product around Afghanistan—a
country the size of France. Likely, this disuse of technical solutions to logistical and
security problems is due to the high degree of complicity between the Taliban, trade
cartels in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and local Afghan government bureaucrats.
Additionally, it is probable that the Taliban’s power is more concentrated than that of the
FARC’s; therefore, the Taliban could rely more on its brute strength than the FARC.
Unofficial reports of the Taliban’s strength are currently 60,000 in a country half the size
of Colombia when at the zenith of the FARC’s force in the late 1990s was estimated at
17,000 guerillas.321
Overall, the drug trade had the effect of making the Taliban less ideological than
they had been before. This is one distinct difference between it and the FARC two after
their conversion to narco-traffickers. Both organizations originated with a simple set of
goals—namely, anti-imperialism and redistributive land reform for peasants in the case
of the FARC and for the Taliban an end to anarchy around the city of Kandahar for the
Taliban. After entering the drug trade that spread to Colombia in the early 1980s the
FARC’s actions focused on leveraging their newfound wealth into winning territory from
the government and protecting its presence in the cocaine trade, all the while generally
assisting with agricultural development. Since the peace talks between FARC and the
Santos government (2010-2018), the state has agreed to heavily invest in rural
development and to allow the FARC to form into a new political party similar to the
Union Patriótica of a generation earlier. Conversely, the Taliban in the minds of many
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observers are nearly a different organization now than they were during the time of their
government (1996-2001). It appears what has changed is that the Taliban is less
socially conservative; although, this has mainly noticed around the more austere edges,
demonstrated by it not enforcing previous edicts against sport, music, and television.
What has remained is the same spirit of nationalism that is suspicious of foreign
interference, but a much greater willingness to cooperate with Afghan security forces
when there was money to be made from such an agreement.
Over its more than fifty-year lifespan the FARC was one of the world’s most
energetic insurgencies. They were deeply involved with countless acts of terrorism and
criminality contributing to tens of thousands of casualties during their war against the
Colombian government. Specifically, their identity was deeply intertwined with KfR and
the cocaine industry, which despite the rebels’ disarmament, are two legacies that
persist with other far-left guerillas groups and far-right paramilitaries in Colombia.
Kidnap for ransom did not noticeably affect the FARC’s organizational behavior—unlike
the cocaine trade. Participating in the cocaine industry significantly enlarged the FARC’s
size and capabilities. One of the most inventive FARC achievements was the
development of the narco-sub which effectively evaded the government and their allies
to lucrative success. These successes translated into military victories against
successive administrations from the 1980s to 2010s, but few political achievements.
The 2016 peace accords negotiated in Havana and ultimately signed in November 2016
have led to the overwhelming majority of FARC fighters to end their violent struggle yet
political progress addressing long-standing leftist grievances remains to be seen.
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The Taliban has been successful over the last quarter century in rising from an
insignificant band of religious student fighters to an army and, for a brief time, a national
government. Today, they continue to pose an ever-present danger existence of the
Western supported Ghani government based in Kabul. Similarly, to the FARC, the
Taliban has its fingers in many exploitative markets including: human trafficking, KfR,
trade in opium, and clear-cutting forests for timber. During the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan (1996-2001) foreign assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
also counted for a great deal of the emirates overall informal budget. If the Taliban had
not yielded to Kandhari’s demand to allow the opium trade to remain open the Taliban
may not have survived long after it seized the city. At various times the Taliban has
taxed drug traffickers, outright owned poppy fields, and taxed farmers whom grow the
lucrative cash crop. Opium is significant for the Taliban for what it allows the
organization to attract a stream of recruits and pay off local provincial police officers,
bureaucrats, and elected officials. Easy money is indeed such a power weapon for the
Taliban that it has little need to adopt up-to-date technologies. Victory on the battlefield
since 2007 has converted to political success for the Taliban who are in on-going peace
negotiations with the United States.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion and Future Research
“Kidnapping hostages is easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a
precious treasure.”322
— Nasser al-Wuhayshi, a leader of AQAP

5.1 Introduction
In March 2013 Italian aid worker Federico Motka received an assignment from
his Geneva-based employer, Impact Initiatives, to examine refugee camps in northeast
Syria for the purpose of conducting interviews for reports on camp management. Impact
Initiatives also hired David Haines, a former British soldier, to provided security and
logistics support to Motka during his assignment to Syria. While returning to their safe
house one afternoon after visiting a camp, men with Kalashnikovs rushed their vehicle
and taking the two men, but leaving their Syrian driver behind. Before they were shoved
into an automobile trunk, Motka telephoned his boss to tell him that he and Haines were
being kidnapped.
Over the course of the next year in captivity Haines and Motka were moved
among several makeshift prisons with other hostages of differing European and
American nationalities from farmhouses to an abandoned hospital, and so forth. The
men and female hostage Kayla Mueller were eventually under the watch of British ISIS
guards they called the Beatles owing to their London accents. During the course of their
captivity, Motka’s and Haines’ treatment varied as they experienced torture,
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confinement to small rooms, denied access to toilets to having freedom to walk and
enough food to eat near the end of their stay with the Beatles. Although their physical
conditions varied at times, phycological abuse was near constant for the men and their
companion hostages. In one instance, Russian hostage Sergey Gorbunov was shot in
the head to be made an example of if ISIS ransom demands were unmet.
For all Haines and Motka had in common as hostages what separated them was
their nations’ willingness or unwillingness to pay ransoms. Both men’s families met with
their respective governments in London and Rome to discuss what would be done to
bring them home. Haines family was told that the British government would do all it
could to free him, but it would not pay his ransom. Federico Motka was release March
2014 after one year in captivity while Haines was murdered in August 2014 along with
the remaining Americans and British captives about six weeks after the last European
hostage left.
How could these two men face drastically different outcomes despite having
been kidnapped together by the same group in Syria at the same time? This chapter will
focus on the topic of ransom payments to armed groups, or as they are more commonly
referred to in the discourse of governments—‘terrorist’ organizations. It will explore the
discussion around the pros and cons of paying ransoms from an ethical and pragmatic
point of view in Section 5.2. Next will follow a review of the American, French, and
Spanish response to demands for ransom payments in Section 5.3 because these three
states represent distinct methods of approaching the dilemma, somewhat more reliable
data exists for foreign hostages than non-Western ones. Furthermore, what this chapter
does is to bring the narrative of kidnap for ransom full circle from exploring types of
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targets in Chapter Three to the kidnapping business in two cases discussed in Chapter
Four to Chapter Five’s examination of the public sector’s varied responses to
kidnapping with particular focus on the most recent hotspot of the area occupied by the
so-called Islamic State. What are the current trends in the research of kidnapping? Two
of the most popular discourses are investigated below in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. In the
last 20 years with the American wars in the Middle East and the rise and fall of ISIS a
serious discussion regarding the permissibility of paying ransoms has emerged. This
topic is closely related to another discussion of the effectiveness of states paying
ransoms too. Lastly, section 5.4 will summarize and conclude the discussion of this
thesis.
A no-concession policy is, as commonly understood, refers to a state’s public or
even unstated position to not negotiate with armed groups over ransom demands. This
position has been adopted by numerous countries that have experienced violence with
terrorism throughout Europe, North America, and South America. It is popular with
governments that want to appear strong and resilient in the face of a much smaller, less
well-equipped adversary.
Norwegian researcher Thomas Hegghammer analyzed 63 kidnappings that
involved 159 hostages in Iraq during 2004. He discovered a case of “contagion” by
which ‘terrorists’ copied the tactics of and learned from similar groups.323 Furthermore,
Hegghammer notes, kidnapping is an efficient tactic because it uses fewer resources
than other common modes of violence such as car bombs or suicide attacks. It is useful
as a propaganda tool because demands from kidnappers may be recycled often during
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negotiations and widely circulated in the media; although, with the use of the Internet a
worldwide audience can be reached by circumventing old media too. Hostage
negotiations can also be the launching pad for wider political negotiations or a way to
material gain.
A 2015 study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point calculated 7,048
kidnappings between 1970 and 2013 conducted by non-state actors, which includes
“terrorists” as well as militants and pirates.324 There was an uptick in kidnappings
beginning in 2001 by ideological jihadist groups mostly fueled by an increase in
domestic kidnappings, e.g. Iraqis kidnapped by Iraqis or Nigerians kidnapped by
Nigerians. From 2001 to July 2015 657 incidents of kidnappings of Westerners by
jihadist groups, or approximately 45 annually.325 Despite the overall number of
Westerners kidnaped constituting a small subset of the total, this subset is notable
because of the impact negotiations of their release can have an outsized impact on
global politics and raise significant financial support to transnational terror groups.
Below, the graph illustrates the overall low number of foreigners taken in Colombia
within the general upward trend during the decade from 1990-1999.326 Between 97 to
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98 percent of kidnappings in Colombia were of native cattle ranchers, business
executives, and local managers of MNCs.327

5.2 Arguments in Support of and Against Paying Ransoms
Logically, a no concessions policy should deter kidnappings because
unrewarded behavior would not be ‘rewarded’ by a refusal to pay. However, this logic is
limited by the assumption that kidnappers are only seeking a financial reward for their
efforts. Hoffman’s definition of terrorism used in this work specify that terrorism is
“ineluctably political in its aims and motives”.328 So, with respect to KfR by an armed
group its goal is foremost political and not financial as it might be for a criminal
syndicate. Therefore, a no-concessions policy to armed groups would not be the best
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deterrent for kidnappings. But there are also other conceptual reasons why a noconcessions policy may not work as expected.
Firstly, kidnappers might not know about or understand the nuances of a state’s
no-concessions policy.329 With 193 member states in the UN it is impossible for anyone
to know the intricacies of each state’s ransom policy—that is, even if a state has
coherent procedures for those situations. Secondly, kidnappers may not believe a
government’s no-concession policy statement.330 Even if a nation does have a
consistent record of not conceding to armed groups’ ransom demands, hostage takers
may still expect payout from the victim’s family, company, or other private source.
Thirdly, kidnappers may not care about a state’s ransom payment policy.331 Evidence
supports that this is the primary reason no-concessions policies are not effective at
deterring KfR.
A no-concessions policy as a means to deter KfR is probably the most cited
reason for its adoption. The policy can also deter governments in a country where a
kidnapping occurs from shirking their responsibilities to protect foreign nationals, legal
residents, and diplomats inside their borders and leaving the responsibility to the
hostage’s home government. This was the original reason for the American noconcessions policy, according to Jenkins.332
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Another popularly cited reason for refusing to pay kidnappers’ ransoms is to deny
‘terrorists’ money to commit future acts of terror. This goal quickly grew in importance
after the attacks of 9/11 as the primary reason no-concession states such as the UK
and US refuse to make payments. Efforts to build an international consensus against
paying ransoms have primarily relied on this logic. “Refusing to pay ransoms to
terrorists, therefore, not only makes it less likely that Americans will be taken hostage,
but it also deprives terrorists of funding critical to their deadly aspirations and
operations.”333
Arguments in support of ransom payments can be divided into the philosophical
and the practical. The best reason to pay ransoms is that when they are paid hostages
come home. Evidence to support this claim comes from Spain, which has brought home
all 70 hostages taken by Somali pirates or Islamic fundamentalist groups.334 No other
nation matches this record. Research conducted by the New America Foundation
calculates that 81 percent of continental EU citizens are released by jihadist terror
groups, compared to 33 percent of Britons and 25 percent of Americans.335 Many
similar statistics of US/UK and continental European countries exist during the post2001 time period.
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What is to be made about the argument that those who pay ransoms are
unwittingly financially supporting terrorism? After all, the organizations examined in the
case studies of the last chapter have done much more harm to locals in their country
than more financially ‘valuable’ Westerners. ISIS did innumerably more damage to
Iraqis and Syrians than to Americans or Italians. According to the doctrine of double
effect, agents that reluctantly financially support terrorism to save a life are less
complicit than one who financially supports terrorism gladly.336 So while it is not good to
financially support terrorism for the negative results that will likely occur to others in the
future, it is not entirely ethically wrong to do so in order to save a life.

5.3 Popular Models from States to Ransom Payment Demands
In the past decade Spain designed a policy toward international kidnappings in
response to the hijacking of a fishing boat, the Alakrana, in the Indian Ocean and the
capture of three aid workers in North Africa by AQIM. This policy of negotiation and
paying ransoms is one of the most liberal KfR polices around the globe with a success
rate of 100 percent since 2009 – 70 in all.337 The goal is to safely recover Spanish
citizens at all costs. In media requests on kidnappings in the last decade members of
the center left Zapatero and center right Rajoy governments have ambiguously
responded that “the government did what it had to do.”338 This statement is a way for
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those politicians to take credit for the return of a hostage while not admitting directly
funding terrorism.
The Spanish media and public opinion are generally quiet with regards to foreign
kidnappings of Spaniards. There are no civic protests with banners and slogans in the
city squares or nightly newscasts chronicling the plight of victims. As the wife of a
former hostage expressed this sentiment, there is no need to protest if we know the
government is doing everything it can to bring our people home.339 The government
requests that the media not report on hostage situations and this wish is honored by the
country’s newspapers. Journalist José Maria Irujo, who writes for the national
newspaper El Pais explained, “No newspapers have broken the pact, which has the
support of everyone from the owners to the reporters. We could scoop each other, but
what value does that have if you put someone’s life in danger?”340 Irujo went on to
summarize the public’s sentiment in favor of paying ransoms as, “Spanish society is not
prepared to accept that our citizens will die for a principle. The government will pay.”341
In France there is a track record of public opinion harnessed in favor of returning
hostages home that originated in the Lebanese hostage crisis. A uniqueness of France
is that when international kidnappings occur, they are seen as “une affaire d’état”, not
simply as an attack on an individual, but as an assault on country.342 A feature of
political culture in France is that the government is understood to protect and provide for
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the welfare of its citizens. When a Frenchman or woman is kidnapped the president is
empowered to take proactive stance in retrieving the victim by force or ransom
payment. In fact, the power of public opinion in hostage situations was first harnessed
by the Mitterrand government during the Lebanese for its own purposes in retrieving
them home. In May 1988, he personally greeted three hostages whom had been in
captivity for three years in Lebanon at Villacoublay Air Base. These hostages, two
diplomats and a journalist, were featured on the nightly news every day of their captivity,
which had the effect of creating huge interest in their condition at home.
In response to the public’s expectations of the role of the government in a hostage
crisis, procedures have developed for resolving hostage situations. It is first determined
whether the abducted were taken for strictly financial or political reasons, of which clear
guidelines have been created. If the nabbing is determined to be criminal/economic in
nature it is managed by the French National Police; however, if the kidnapping is
primarily political it is managed by a small group that sometime consists of the head of
intelligence, the presidential chief of staff, and the defense minister. All the while the
president is continually informed and requires approves of any deal.
Despite, France’s reputation of quickly capitulating to ransom demands this is not
the case, and; although the French will negotiate for hostages they do not always pay.
Sometimes ransom demands are too expensive, or demands cost too much
strategically. The process that has developed over the past thirty years has become
highly politicized. A hostage’s safe return home is expected and is greeted with fanfare
and positive coverage for a president. However, the murder of a hostage will be seen as
a failure of the leader and can result in a public outcry and reckoning.
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The United States longstanding no-concessions policy developed during the Nixon
administration after the kidnappings of two American diplomats and one Belgian at the
American embassy in Khartoum in March, 1972.343 Members of the Black September
organization demanded Palestinian prisoners be released in Israel, RAF members freed
in Germany, and Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy’s assassin, released as well. It was
politically impossible for Nixon to pardon the man who murdered a political rival who
was also the brother of John F Kennedy, a man whom many considered martyred after
his tragic death. Soon after President Nixon’s refusal to negotiate with the hostagetakers became public all three officials were shot in the basement of the Khartoum
embassy. Thereafter no-concessions became the general guiding principle of situations
with American hostages held abroad.344
Despite this seemingly stubborn policy there were many caveats that made noconcessions less austere than on its face. Firstly, no-concessions only directly related to
demands made from ‘terrorists’ to the United States government. Secondly, kidnappings
deemed criminal in nature within the US are under the authority of the FBI and ransoms
are often paid in these situations. In fact, the FBI used ransom monies paid to
kidnappers to track the perpetrators so often that today this crime is virtually nonexistent in the United States. Thirdly, families of private citizens kidnapped abroad were
not prohibited from paying ransoms for the release of their loved ones or their company
as many such individuals are corporate executives.345Fourthly, as airline hijackings
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occurred, the primary goal of the government was the safety of the passengers’ lives.346
Fifthly, prisoners of war were never considered as having the same status as those
kidnapped.347
After a swell of public outrage by families of kidnaped Americans by ISIS,
President Barak Obama ordered a review of American ransom policy in the fall of 2014.
All federal agencies connected to hostage policy were represented in a number of
meetings that included perticipants from the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justice Department, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, State Department, and Treasury Department. What
developed from those meetings is a new coordinated manner of resolving hostage
cases still involving the same departments and agencies now under the leadership of
the FBI as it has jurisdiction in kidnappings.

5.4 Conclusion and Final Remarks
There is a longstanding debate about the effectiveness of states not paying
ransoms to kidnappers to deter future kidnappings. Proponents of no-concessions
suggest that their position projects a principled resolve that is not intimidated by
violence that deter future kidnappings because kidnappers do not expect to be paid for
their effort. Opponents of no-concession policies counter that kidnappings by armed
groups are not deterred by states’ unwillingness to pay ransoms and that refusals only
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make freeing hostages more difficult. Despite some anecdotal evidence by kidnappers
themselves and the occasional study to suggest the contrary, there is no strong
evidence to suggest that kidnappers target based on nationality. Accordingly, it is
unlikely refusals to pay actually deter kidnappings of valuable targets. However, there is
merit that no-concessions policies do protect a country’s internal rule of law and ensure
long-term good governance by adhering to principles that do not make political
concessions.
In response to kidnappings by armed groups, a variety of policies by
governments have been tried over the past fifty years. In the three cases explored
above, domestic politics and a response to a particular kidnapping incident led to the
adoption of a wider practice of responding to kidnappers’ ransom demands. When this
topic is in the national debate, interest groups and the media can sometimes have an
outsized influence on tipping the hand of government policy makers, such as in France
with the support committees or in the US with the family of James Foley. What little
research exists indicates that the most effective method to end kidnappings is
destroying the organization, as for example occurred in the wake of heightened piracy
off the Horn of Africa over the last decade. Three multinational coalitions patrolled an
enormous area from the coast of Somalia to the Strait of Hormoz and the Red Sea.
Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of armed
groups? This work’s thesis is: Kidnappings grows the infrastructure demands required
to house victims, increases financial resources from ransom payments, and furthers
clandestineness by members of the group. While this thesis is a logical conclusion to
the research question this outcome was not substantiated by the two case studies
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explored in chapter four. The FARC and the Taliban are two recent examples of groups
that regularly use KfR as a terror tactic, but in the wider scope of the groups’ activities it
constituted a small proportion of those groups’ overall tactics. What was and is most
important to the FARC and to the Taliban’s financial assets are their participation in the
narcotics trade. With the large financial resources acquired from the drug trade both
groups bought influence with locals, expanded their materiel capabilities, attracted new
recruits, and underwent alterations but not thorough changes to their ideology.
Some key points discussed in this work are that: Violent crime often correlates
with high rates of kidnap for ransom across the globe. Economic inequality, weak rule of
law, and unstable governance are also statistically significant markers for areas with a
notorious kidnapping industry. Despite its commonness there is little that can be said
about how most abductions occur, and so there is no ‘typical’ kidnapping incidence. An
armed group’s ideology is a major factor that helps them focus their resources and
energy on a set of targets that are enemies. Based on that criteria, an organization can
begin to make informed decisions regarding individual targets and what tactics to use in
order to neutralize it, e.g. assassination, KfR, bombing, mass shooting. High profile
individuals who are at risk use a combination of protective technology and techniques
that may include a security team to defend themselves and frustrate their assailants.
However, besides members of the military ordinary people have precious few methods
to guard themselves from attack.
The FARC and the Taliban arose during tumultuous times during their country’s
history. Both organizations share a nationalistic orientation and spread a message of
justice and order that resonated with common people. After varied success each group
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entered the drug trade, albeit for different reasons, and was able to profit and expand
their operations to a formidable status that challenged their respective governments’
authority. In response to setbacks each group faced they tried to make up for lost
revenue while continuing to further their mission by adopting a kidnap for ransom tactic.
However, this only minorly supplemented the financial resources the drug trade
provided. Ultimately, for the FARC and the Taliban KfR had a larger political payout
than a financial one as a result of using their hostages as bargaining chips—as one
might expect from a tactic of terrorism.
Internationally, policies of no-concessions to ransom demands from armed
groups has had a scattered acceptance by states over about the past 50 years. No one
approach has dominated in popularity or acceptance and many times governments
have taken an ad hoc approach to the way they respond to these situations. Since the
early part of the last decade the United Kingdom and the United States have sought to
build a consensus around a refusal to meet ransom demands, as the world’s two most
outspoken critics of KfR payments. Yet, there efforts did little to form a lasting
agreement on the practice, besides rhetorical victories, and the movement to forge a
worldwide policy has deteriorated.
This work highlights the ability to which it is possible to understand how an armed
group changes over time. It is difficult but not impossible to construct a causal chain of
events when the most relevant data is examined. Narrative history and journalism are
valuable tools in this search. Although the community of social scientists understand
that those who commit acts of terror are rational actors like anyone else, policy makers
and voters should not assume that seemingly senseless violence is without reason and
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does not have political motives at their core of the perpetrator’s motives. For the sake of
protecting life against violence it is vital that CT authorities and policy makers
understand the innerworkings of illegal dark networks to thwart their attacks on civilians,
especially. Furthermore, it is in the best interest of all parties involved—hostages, their
governments, private security contractors, and even hostage-takers—that governments
have a clear, cohesive ransom policy articulated. Policy makers need to ask themselves
what are their priorities with their ransom policy and are those priorities actually met by
it. What little research that is available indicates at the least that no-concessions policies
do not deter kidnappings to the extent their proponents suggest they do. Nevertheless,
scientific research cannot answer what a society’s highest values are: only the people in
a society and their leaders can answer this question.
Future research on kidnap for ransom should explore ways that it can be
reported to a responsible institution when local authorities cannot be trusted by their
populace. Possible future research questions are: Has globalization integrated armed
groups into the world economy? Has COVID-19 affected trends in KfR or human
trafficking since 2020? A significant part of the problem with respect to combating this
problem is the lack of transparency about which groups kidnap. In the majority of cases
this information is not known of course some notorious organizations are well famous. A
centralized database that contains basic information about a kidnapping case would go
a long way in identifying trends with the larger goal of protecting lives from harm and
denying insurgencies and armed groups funds to operate. This goal is one that many
diverse peoples can rally around. Particularly since the migrant crisis of 2015, al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb has proliferated its human smuggling and KfR operations. Now
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is the time to address this matter of safety that is affecting the flow of migrants from
many nations who are fleeing turmoil and hardship in their homes.
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